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branch makes the law; the executive branch enforces the law; and the
judicial branch interprets the law. As first-year law students read their first
cases, they quickly learn the descriptive inadequacy of this model of
American government popularized by seventh-grade history classes. Judges
throughout American history have made law. Even in this "age of
statutes,"' judges, in their development of the common law, continue to
prescribe rules to fill gaps left by legislatures.
When judges act as common-law decision makers, their declarations are

always subject to the dissatisfaction of the legislature. Only when judges
make constitutional pronouncements are their decisions insulated from
legislative review. Consequently, judges attract far less criticism when they
make common law than when they make constitutional law. Judges often
lack an applicable statute to interpret, yet still must adjudicate disputes.
One can hardly condemn judges for formulating rules when no other extant
source of law (other than the past words of other judges) is available to
guide them.
Constitutional decision makers have a source to interpret; however, a
text does not always make their job any easier, and indeed, probably makes
it harder. The Constitution is couched in general terms, which leaves
judges with the responsibility of filling interpretative gaps. Throughout
American history, the Supreme Court has used various methods to fill these
gaps. This article explores one method that has attracted little attention:
the constitutionalization of common law.
Perhaps because development of the common law and constitutional
interpretation seem like distinct enterprises, the link between the two has
gone largely unexplored. As a descriptive matter, however, the dichotomy
fails to account for the influence that the common law has had on constitutional interpretation as an interpretative gap filler. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in recent years has used the results of the deliberations of state
judges to establish federal constitutional standards.
The constitutionalization of the common law has a checkered history.
In the series of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century decisions known as
the Lochner era, the Court used a brand of common-law constitutionalization to strike down legislative enactments. This era now is no more
than an epithet to most and the very symbol of judicial arrogation of
legislative power.' This article takes no further whacks at this very dead

1. GuIDo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
2. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court struck down a New
York law limiting the work hours of bakery employees as an unreasonable interference with
the common-law liberty of contract. "It was the defining character of the Lochner era, and
its characteristic vice, that the Court treated the common-law background (in those days,
common-law property rights and contractual autonomy) as paramount, while regarding
congressional legislation to abrogate the common law on these economic matters as
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/6
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horse.3
Instead, this article examines, through the lens of three recent cases
(each construing a separate constitutional provision), the use that the
modem Supreme Court has made of the common law as a vehicle for
establishing constitutional standards. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,4 the
Court utilized state common-law procedures to establish the minimum level
of due process required for reviewing the size of punitive damage awards.
In Ohio v. Roberts5 the Court introduced the concept of "firmly rooted"
common-law hearsay exceptions to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause. Finally, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council6 the Court

established the so-called "nuisance exception" to the requirement of just

constitutionally suspect." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("If accepted, [the claim that the State of California was
constitutionally prohibited from revising its own law of trespass] would represent a return
to the era of Lochner v. New York [citation omitted] when common-law rights were also
found immune from revision by State or Federal Government. Such an approach would
freeze the common law as it has been constructed by the coirts, perhaps at its 19th-century
state of development."). Nonetheless, some of the cases that constitutionalized non-economic common-law rights are still cited favorably by modem courts. See, e.g., Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (finding that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment includes "generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men")).
3. The phenomenon described in this paper is distinct from Henry Monaghan's
discussion of the Supreme Court's power to fashion "constitutional common law," which he
describes as "a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their
inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions." Henry
P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975)
(describing the exclusionary rule and the rules regarding police questioning of suspects
articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as a reflection of this common-law
authority).
The topic of this paper is also distinct from the broader notion of federal common law
which, at least in its modem form, arises mainly in connection with defining and enforcing
the rights and obligations of the federal government left unaddressed by federal statutes.
See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1945). For a survey of this
area of law, see chapter VII of RIcHARD FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].

Finally, the subject of this paper is unrelated to the concept of a general federal
common law that federal courts would have the power to promulgate in diversity cases in
lieu of state law, but which would not bind state courts in future litigation. This power,
established in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), was put to rest in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
5. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
6. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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compensation for total takings.
Each of these cases used the common law for distinct purposes and
with different impulses driving the Court's reliance upon it. Each use of
the common law presents different problems. Yet at least at its most
general level, the Court's constitutionalization project uses the common law
to discipline itself and other courts in the face of uncertainty. The need for
this discipline is a function of the Court's tendency to articulate broad
constitutional principles rather than narrow rules when interpreting unclear
constitutional provisions. The common law serves as a check on the
aggregation of judicial power, one that is self-imposed and driven by the
Court's concern for its own legitimacy and its consequent desire to create
limits for itself and other courts that seem divorced from the Court's own
personal preferences.
This article attempts to explain how the Court has utilized this
particular method of constitutional adjudication while examining the
problems raised by the practice. It also explores the windows that this
practice opens to expose the larger imperfections that are often endemic to
constitutional interpretation. Finally, this article will attempt to determine
whether the Court's constitutionalization project bolsters or undermines the
legitimacy of the Court's role as the final and authoritative voice on
constitutional law.
I.

THE QUESTIONS, PROBLEMS, AND USES OF CONSTrrUTIONALIZATION

At its core, the constitutionalization dilemma is about what role, if any,
the past and present judges of fifty separate states, as well as federal judges
developing the common law, should have in establishing federal constitutional standards when addressing non-federal questions. One could argue
that common-law constitutionalization is simply another term for upholding
state court interpretations of the United States Constitution. After all, state
courts must interpret the federal Constitution whenever cases before them
present constitutional issues. The Supreme Court then may overrule state
court interpretations, uphold the state court decision and thereby transform
a state judge's interpretation into a federal constitutional standard, or
simply not review the state court's decision because either the parties did
not petition the Court for certiorari or the Court declined to issue the writ.
This process of constitutional review is an inevitable and unproblematic
aspect of our system of constitutional federalism.
However, this suggestion fails to explain adequately the nature of
constitutionalization. First, the constitutionalization of the common law is
seldom, if ever, about state court "interpretations" of the federal Constitution. Indeed, the cases that develop state common law that is later
constitutionalized by the Supreme Court almost never involve federal
constitutional claims. In most of these cases, the state court developing the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/6
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common-law standard was not interpreting the Constitution, or even federal
law.
Further, the Supreme Court does not constitutionalize the common law
based upon the quality and persuasiveness of the state court's interpretation. Instead, the Court infuses with significance the mere fact that the
court said what it said at all. Thus, whatever the Supreme Court is doing
when it constitutionalizes state common law, it is not upholding an
interpretation of the Constitution in the sense of a considered attempt to
assess the meaning of the document's text, history, and structure. Instead,
the Supreme Court is constitutionalizing something that has not been
constitutionally derived.
In this method of constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court uses the
common law for different purposes. In Honda the Court resorted to the
common law to establish a federal constitutional right. In contrast, the
Court used the common law in Ohio v. Roberts and subsequent cases to
cabin an individual constitutional right. Finally, the Court in Lucas used
the common law to limit legislative encroachment on a constitutionally
protected right, simultaneously deferring to state law and avoiding the
creation of an even more uncertain heightened scrutiny standard.7
When the Court constitutionalizes judicial decisions that did not even
purport to address federal constitutional questions, it could be doing one of
several things. The first rationale for constitutionalization of common law
is that the Court could be according constitutional significance to a shared
common-law consensus among state courts simply because most, if not all,
state courts have come to the same conclusion about the wisdom and
fairness of a certain practice. One could attempt to justify this first mode
of constitutionalization in three different ways. State court consensus could
reflect the Framer's intent, serve as a gap-filling mechanism, or provide the
occasion for an extra-textual constitutional amendment.
First, one could argue that the appearance of such a consensus is the
best historical evidence the Court has of the understood meaning of a
constitutional provision and what was considered to be an acceptable
practice. Under this view, the closer to the time of the relevant provision's
ratification that this historical understanding reveals itself, the better. The
difficulty with this justification is that the Constitution expressly incorporates the common law in one instance. 8 Thus, we can apply a popular
mode of statutory interpretation: Given that the Congress that voted on the

7. Furthermore, in the Roberts and Lucas cases, the Court accorded constitutional
significance to the continuing and future pronouncements of today's state courts as opposed
to confining the search for such transcendent pronouncements to, for example, preFourteenth Amendment courts.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved... according to the rules of the common law.").
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Bill of Rights "knew how" to constitutionalize common law, we should not
be so quick to assume that other constitutional provisions that lack similar
language were also meant to incorporate the common law.9
The second justification for constitutionalization of common-law
consensus among state courts is that the consensus provides material to fill
in gaps in the Constitution when it is otherwise impossible to ascertain the
effect of the provision on the relevant issue. The Framers might have
deliberately created such gaps by leaving the wording of a provision vague
to give it evolving content. Alternatively, the inability to divine the
meaning of a provision itself might have created the gap." Third and
most radically in justifying constitutionalization of common-law consensus
is that the consensus of state courts, coupled with the feedback mechanism
of society's silent and longstanding approval, amends the Constitution in
an extended and severely toned down Ackermanesque "constitutional moment." 11
Second in the list of rationales for constitutionalization of common-law
decisions is that the Court could be using the gloss and legitimacy of the
common law to create post hoc justifications for policy moves that the
Court wants to make, but for which it needs to find a historical hook to
cover its machinations. On the other hand, the Court might be using the
common law to avoid injecting the policy views of the judiciary into future
constitutional interpretation under the theory that the certainty of state court
precedent (wise or not) is superior to the uncertainty of case-by-case

9. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995) (concluding that because
Congress "knew how" to draft a statute that penalized people for intending to use a firearm,
its use of different language in defining a separate offense meant that Congress had not
intended that offense to include the intent to use a firearm).
10. Under this explanation, the Court would not necessarily need to immunize such a
consensus from legislative review. Instead, like "constitutional common law" and Judge
Calabresi's call for judge-made common law that overrules anachronistic statutes, infra note
43, the Court could use such a consensus to revise a legislative enactment with the
understanding that if the current legislature disapproved of the decision, it could then revise
the Court.
11. See Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 63
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). Professor Ackerman argues that Article V of the Constitution
does not constitute the sole method for amending the Constitution. In addition, the
Constitution can be and has been amended several times by the process of a severe alteration
of constitutional doctrine in response to a "challenge to institutions" derived from an
"electoral mandate" that is a kind of comment upon a "constitution impasse." Id. at 79. The
kinds of constitutional issues dealt with in this paper are scarcely the kinds of revolutionary
changes that Ackerman's theory is meant to characterize. Nevertheless, it is worth at least
noting the similarity. For a critical response to Ackerman's more unconstrained approach
to constitutional interpretation, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221
(1995).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/6
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adjudication. Along this same line, the Court could be responding to other
limitations inherent in constitutional interpretation. A third rationale for the
Court's use of the common law might simply be an attempt to protect the
expectations that have developed in reliance upon the common law.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMMON-LAW PUNITIVE DAMAGES
EXCESSIVENESS REVIEW

A.

Generally

The Supreme Court resorts to common-law constitutionalization most
frequently when attempting to identify Anglo-American traditions to divine
the meaning of vague constitutional provisions.' 2 Under the Court's
framework, tradition can affect the shape and scope of constitutional rights
in two basic ways. First, the widespread adoption of a practice with
historical support can insulate it from constitutional attack.' 3 Second, a
12. While this article focuses on the common law end of the analysis, the Supreme
Court obviously does not solely look to the common law to establish the existence of a
tradition. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (pointing to both a statutory
and common law pedigree in determining the extent of protection that the Constitution offers
to a student faced with corporal punishment); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (identifying a general American tradition of extended families living together using
secondary historical material and not common-law decisions); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (finding support for its decision that property tax exemptions for churches
do not violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause in "an unbroken practice" of
according such exemptions).
The Court's analysis of tradition frequently begins by describing British statutory and
common law traditions. In Murray'sLessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272 (1855), for example, the Court said that to determine the content of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, it had to
look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the
common and statue [sic] law of England, before the emigration of our
ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil
and political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement of this country.
Id. at 277. British protection of a right, however, is not the sine qua non of due process
analysis as evidenced by the Court's decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In
Winship the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal charges was a
requirement of due process. Id. at 364. The Court wrote that "[tjhe requirement that guilt
of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from
our early years as a Nation." Id. at 361. While the requirement of a 'higher degree of
persuasion in criminal cases"' was much older, said the Court, the 'crystallization into the
formula "beyond a reasonable doubt" seems to have occurred as late as 1798."' Id. at 361
(quoting CHARLEs T. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 681-82 (1954)).
It was thus the widespread and early acceptance of the requirement in America that made
the difference.
13. The core case of this section, Honda Motor Co., is an example of establishing a

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
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constitutional right through tradition. Consequently, this will be the major focus of this part
of the paper. Nonetheless, the question of the use of tradition to defeat constitutional rights
has garnered far more criticism than the use of tradition to establish constitutional rights, and
this section will refer to several cases that address the practice of using tradition to justify
the refusal to recognize constitutional rights. The core case of Part III, Ohio v. Roberts, also
is an example of limiting constitutional rights through the common law. Essentially, the
issues presented by the use of the common law to defeat constitutional rights involve (1) the
extent to which a right must have been recognized, or not prohibited, by other jurisdictions,
present and past, to qualify as fundamental under the Constitution; (2) to what extent the
absence of such protection suggests that the Constitution does not protect the right, see, for
example, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(denying that "the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is to confim the importance of
interests already protected by a majority of the States"); and (3) the level of specificity at
which one should define a right to determine if it has traditionally been accorded protection,
id. at 127 n.6. See generally Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia's Due Process
Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Jurisdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication Without
Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981 (1992) (arguing that Justice Scalia's use of tradition as a
value-free method to cabin due process rights is unworkable and not free from values
external to the tradition); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990) (arguing inter alia that Justice Scalia's
method of determining whether a right is fundamental by examining the most specific level
at which the tradition protects or denies the asserted right is not valueless); L. Benjamin
Young, Jr., Justice Scalia's History and Tradition: The Chief Nightmare in Professor
Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. REv. 581 (1992) (using Michael H. v. GeraldD., 491 U.S.
110 (1989), as a vehicle to argue that Justice Scalia's due process analysis is no less
subjective than the analysis by Justice Brennan).
The Court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884), established the rule that
"a process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law,
if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and this country .... " The
Court modified the Hurtado principle in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908),
concluding that a departure from traditional procedures may violate due process if it
contravenes "fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action,
which have relation to process of law and protect the citizen in his private right, and guad
him against the arbitrary action of government." Id. at 101. Justice Scalia has contended that
"a process approved by the legal traditions of our people is 'due' process" without further

inquiry. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment). But see Pacific Mut. Life Ins., 499 U.S. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that "widespread adherence to a historical practice" should not
always necessarily "foreclosel further inquiry when a party challenges an ancient institution
or procedure as violative of due process); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604,
621-22 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (conceding that a historical practice no longer widely accepted
could conceivably be constitutionally vulnerable).
The Court has only occasionally struck down practices with a long and venerable
tradition. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heituer, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (invalidating quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction where the property that is asserted as the basis for jurisdiction is unrelated to the
plaintiffs cause of action); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down
the tradition of racial segregation in public schooling). Justice Scalia argued in Rutan v.
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), that the elimination of
tradition was only justified in Brown because the unambiguous text of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments "leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people differently

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/6
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widespread historical practice can itself become a constitutional right.14
In Honda the Court held that Oregon's system for determining punitive
damages liability violated Honda's right to procedural due process because
it did not provide for post-verdict judicial review of the amount of the
award. 5 The traditional common-law practice of providing excessiveness
review was the determinative factor in the Court's analysis. 6 The Court
first pointed to six British cases all of which, it claimed, provided for some
excessiveness review at common law.' 7 Next, the Court demonstrated the
use of some form of excessiveness review in the nineteenth century through
a variety of sources of law, namely two early federal circuit decisions, four
state decisions, and several treatises." Finally, the Court referred to more
recent cases from forty-nine states that provided for some judicial review

because of their race are invalid." Regardless of what one thinks about this argument, it
certainly fails to explain the Court's decision in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239
(1970), which struck down the then widespread and historical practice of imprisoning those
who could not pay their fines for longer than the statutory maximum. The Williams case had
little to do with the supposedly unambiguous language of the Equal Protection Clause's
proscription against race-based distinctions.
14. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
15. Id. at 432. There was significant controversy in the case over what exactly
Oregon's system allowed in terms of post-verdict excessiveness review and the adequacy of
its other methods for constraining jury discretion. Indeed, the precise nature of Oregon's
procedures was the focal point of respondent Oberg's oral argument. See Oral Argument of
Laurence H. Tribe on Behalf of the Respondent, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415
(1994) (No. 93-644), in 230 LANDmARK BRmFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNrrED STATES: CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAW 541 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1995).
16. The Court stated "Oregon's abrogation of a well-established common-law protection
against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption that its procedures violate the
Due Process Clause. As this Court has stated from its first Due Process cases, traditional
practice provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis." Honda, 512 U.S. at 430.
17. Id. at 422-23. The Court discounted the case of Beardmore v. Carrington,95 Eng.
Rep. 790 (C.P. 1764), which asserted that there were no English cases that awarded a new
trial based upon the excessiveness of a damages award. Id. at 793. The Court pointed to the
fact that the cases that it cites post-dated Beardmore and thereby overruled Beardmore's
suggestion that appellate review of excessive damage awards was not required at common
law. Honda, 512 U.S. at 423-24.
18. Honda, 512 U.S. at 424-26. The Court, however, conceded that "[j]udicial
deference to jury verdicts may have been stronger in eighteenth-century America than in
England, and judges' power to order new trials for excessive damages more contested." Id.
at 434 n.12. The Court pointed to practices during nineteenth-century America leading up
to the Fourteenth Amendment as the "crucial time" for assessing whether the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause protected the right to excessiveness review. Id. (citing
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990)). According to the Court, such review
was "well established in American courts" by the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
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of punitive damages awards. 9 While the Court acknowledged that a state
could constitutionally depart from traditionally required procedures, the
Court determined that the state could only do so if it provided a "similar
substitute"--something the Court found Oregon failed to do.2"
B. The Common Law as Tradition
The incorporation of common-law tradition to protect constitutional
rights is the least controversial mode of constitutionalization. After all,
what one feels one is "due" often will depend at a minimum upon what
others similarly situated have been entitled to in the past. Just as the
younger sibling feels that she should have the same curfew that the older
sibling had, "due process" has long been thought to incorporate a baseline
minimum of protected rights that privilege past entitlements. While the
Court recognized that strict adherence to the past, even when protecting
individual rights, "den[ies] every quality of the law but its age and
[renders] it incapable of progress or improvement,"'" the Honda case
indicates that the Court will not hesitate to set a common-law floor limiting
how low the state may go in the protection of life, liberty, or property. In
this way, the Court uses the common-law tradition to police the few states
that have chosen their own path.
The use of tradition is bolstered by the argument that the ratifiers of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments meant "due process" to refer to those
procedures in effect prior to the time that the relevant constitutional
provision was ratified.'
Under this explanation, constitutionalization
becomes difficult to distinguish from "originalist" attempts to construe the
meaning of the Constitution.2 Thus, the Honda Court pointed to the
19. Id. at 426.
20. Id. at 430-32. The Court also found no changes occurred in society over time that
justified a departure from the traditional practice. Id. at 431.
21. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
22. Note that this theory would mean that due process would have a different content
for the states than for the federal government given that the "law of the Land" was different
in 1868 than in 1790. "As a matter of common law, the assessment of uncertain damages
during the Framing generation was a protected jury function." Alan Howard Schener,
JudicialAssessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury
Power, 91 COLUM. L. Rv. 142, 156 (1991); see also Brief of Legal Historians Daniel R.
Coquillette et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
512 U.S. 415 (1994) (No. 93-644), in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 15, at 367-70
[hereinafter Brief of Legal Historians]. As one commentator notes, however, the discrepancy
may have been justified inasmuch as "it is entirely possible that [the Fourteenth Amendment's] state ratifiers did not object to limitations on the federal government that they were
unwilling to place upon themselves." Greenberger, supra note 13, at 993 n.52. Honda,
however, is an example of placing a limit upon the states that would not necessarily limit
the federal government.
23. Justice Black tried to resolve this interpretative dilemma in In re Winship, 397 U.S.
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widespread use of excessiveness review in the period prior to ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24
The Court also seems to find relevant at times the post-ratification
follow-through of the common-law tradition.' For example, in Honda and
many other cases, although the Court relies on the historical consensus, it
also accords significance to the post-ratification continuation of the
tradition. 26 Furthermore, sometimes the Court does not even distinguish

358 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black, while agreeing with the Court in Murray's
Lessee that "due process of law" was synonymous with the Magna Carta's use of the words

"law of the land," disagreed with that Court about the meaning of the phrase. Winship, 397
U.S. at 385. To Justice Black, due process meant only that the government must act
"according to the 'law of the land'--thatis, according to written constitutional and statutory
provisions as interpreted by court decisions." Id. at 382. Due process contained no
independent content beyond the requirement that the government act according to law. Id.
As he recognized, however, this interpretation had been rejected a long time earlier by,
among others, the Court in Murray's Lessee. Id. The Murray's Lessee Court declared it
"manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be
devised." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276 (1855).
24. Honda, 512 U.S. at 425. Moreover, the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), wrote that "the common-law method for assessing punitive
damages was well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted" and that
"[n]othing in that Amendment's text or history indicates an intent on the part of its drafters
to overturn the prevailing method." Id. at 17-18. The Court in Haslip also referred to past
Court opinions that said the Fourteenth Amendment cannot trump practices which were two
hundred years old absent some compelling explanation. Id. at 17. Haslip, however, used
the ratification date of the Fourteenth Amendment to insulate practices from constitutional
scrutiny, whereas Honda used pre-ratification history to strike down a practice that departed
from tradition.
25. Likewise, using pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases would make little sense in a
situation where post-Fourteenth Amendment developments have altered the legal landscape
as to a particular issue. See Note, Excessiveness Review for CapitalDefendants After Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1305, 1317-20 (1995) (arguing that since cases like
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), radically altered the death penalty legal landscape
in the 1970s, the Court should only utilize post-Furman history to determine whether courts
must afford capital defendants excessiveness review).
26. The Court pointed in Honda to the fact that 49 states currently had adopted some
form of the procedure. Honda, 512 U.S. at 426; see, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of state assumption ofjurisdiction over nonresidents based solely upon the non-resident's physical presence in the state). "This
American jurisdictional practice is, moreover, not merely old; it is continuing." Id. at 615.
The opinion later said that the retention of old procedures inconsistent with certain
fundamental values might be unconstitutional where the procedure "is engaged in by only
a very small minority of the States. Where, however,... a jurisdictional principle is both
firmly approved by tradition and still favored, it is impossible to imagine what standard we
could appeal to for the judgment that it is 'no longer justified."' Id. at 622 (quoting Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977)); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep'tof Health, 497
U.S. 261, 295 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[M]ost states that did not explicitly prohibit
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between the pre-ratification and post-ratification tradition in attempting to
establish a historical consensus.2 7 Nonetheless, the Court has minimized
the importance of a consensus in modem practice when the consensus is
not historically rooted.28
This mode of constitutionalization's appeal to the Court is obvious.
Tradition at least appears to provide a value free reference point to which
judges may resort without injecting their own views into the decisionmaking process.29 Under this view, the decisions of the past are not
necessarily philosophically superior but only more divorced from the
judge's own perceptions. Thus perhaps the most influential originalist
jurist of this era, Justice Antonin Scalia, also relies heavily upon tradition
when interpreting what he deems to be vaguely worded constitutional
language where there is no direct evidence of original intent." The two
approaches derive from the same desire to purge judicial decision making
of the personal values of the individual judges that preside over the

assisted suicide in 1868 recognized, when the issue arose in the 50 years following the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, that assisted and (in some cases) attempted suicide
were unlawful.").
27. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261 (1990). In finding a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in the right to refuse medical treatment, the Court held that right to be "[t]he
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent" which, the Court observed, had
"become firmly entrenched in American tort law." Id. at 269-70. The Court, however, made

no mention of whether the right to informed consent became entrenched before or after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
28. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1997) ("Nor does the fact that
a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affimative defenses-for whatever reasons-mean that those States that strike a different balance are in
violation of the Constitution."); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 447 (1992) (commenting
that "[c]ontemporary practice [is] of limited relevance to the due process inquiry"); Martin
v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (holding no violation of the Constitution occurred when only
two states retained the historical practice of forcing the defendant to prove self-defense in
a criminal trial).
29. See, e.g., Honda, 512 U.S. at 421-26. The Court initially looked to tradition to
determine if appellate review of excessive punitive damage awards was constitutionally
required rather than looking, for example, to the more indeterminate balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
30. See Greenberger, supra note 13, at 989 (noting that "Justice Scalia's implicit
solution to the problem of interpreting open-textured constitutional provisions ...inthe face
of an ambiguous or nonexistent historical record is to substitute 'tradition' for original
intent"). A particularly striking example of Justice Scalia's reliance upon tradition is his
dissenting opinion in Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 92-115 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), where he argued that the hiring of state employees based upon party affiliation
was not in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 97. As he put it, "[s]uch a venerable
and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining table and scrutinized for its
conformity to some abstract principle of First Amendment adjudication devised by this
Court To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the Court's
principles are to be formed." Id. at 95-96.
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process." Moreover, requiring adherence to tradition is less intrusive upon
the legislature than a modem
judicially created standard such as the
32
Mathews balancing test.
The central objection to the constitutionalization of common-law
tradition in this case is not that it privileged the opinions ofjudges over the
legislature. Instead, the main objection is to a particular kind of federalism
that one might call lateral federalism, which involves privileging the
traditions of a great number of states over those of the few. This kind of
constitutionalization essentially says that a minority of states must follow
what the significant majority of states have done in the past and continue
to do in the present. They must do so not because the practices of the
minority are inconsistent with some fundamental theory of liberty,
functional theory of efficiency, or balancing test, but the minority of states
must fall into line simply because the majority of states have a longstanding tradition of doing things a different way. The Court's efforts to make
its own jurisprudence value free force the non-conforming minority of
states to follow the practices of the majority of states. The Court
enunciated no compelling analytical basis to support the constitutionalization of common-law tradition in Honda beyond the widespread and
longstanding silent acceptance of state judges' views on proper punitive

31. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987). Powell
believes:
Originalism's attractiveness, for the most part, lies in the possibility it
seems to offer the judicial interpreter of an escape from personal
responsibility. Believing or at least fearing that constitutional decisions
necessarily must reflect the subjective value-preferences of someone, the

originalist insists that judges must refrain from imposing their personal
preferences in a democratic society.
Id. at 659-60 (footnote omitted); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. CiN. L. REv. 849 (1989). Scalia observed:
[Tihe main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution--or, for
that matter, in judicial interpretation of any law-is that the judges will
mistake their own predilections for the law....
Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the
system, for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite
separate from the preferences of the judge himself.
Id. at 863-64.
32. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. The Mathews test requires courts evaluating the
constitutionality of state procedures to weigh "the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; ... the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest; ... and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 335.
The Court in Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202), refused to
apply the Mathews test in evaluating state criminal procedures, preferring instead to ask only
if a particular procedure violated some fundamental value "'rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people."'
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damages review procedure.
As a practical matter, the Court constitutionalization of tradition may
improperly focus on a state's trees to the exclusion of its forest and thus
foster an insensitivity to the inner workings of the state's procedural
system. In Honda, for example, while the state of Oregon failed to provide
post-verdict excessiveness review, it accorded more effective pre-verdict
procedures than the state of Alabama employed under the procedures
approved in Haslip3 The Honda Court nonetheless found that Oregon
had "provided no similar substitute for the protection provided by judicial
review of the amount awarded by the jury in punitive damages."34 Thus,
the Court defined the relevant due process baseline as sufficient postverdict protection in the form of excessiveness review and did not allow
the added security of other pre- and post-verdict procedures to suffice in
the absence of excessiveness review. While Oregon's procedures probably
did a better job of constraining the jury before the fact, the other states'
procedures probably did a better job of rooting out those few situations
where it was obvious the jury had gone astray-even though the jury's
deviation might have been occasioned largely by the absence of sufficient
pre-verdict safeguards. The Court's opinion, however, refused to examine
whether or not the procedural differences were, in the end, a wash.3
Instead of emphasizing the total quantum of defendant protection that the
entire proceeding offered, the Court compartmentalized the protections and

33. Honda, 512 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Several preverdict mechanisms
channeled the jury's discretion more tightly in this case than in... Haslip ... ."). The
dissent also pointed to certain post-verdict procedures afforded by Oregon and concluded
that "[Oregon's] procedures are perhaps more likely to prompt rational and fair punitive
damage decisions than are the post hoc checks employed in jurisdictions following
Alabama's pattern." Id. at 444; see also Brief for Respondent, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
512 U.S. 415 (1994) (No. 93-644), in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 15, at 18-19
(recognizing the same pre- and post-verdict procedures as Justice Ginsburg and noting the
fact that "the size of the mean punitive damages award in Oregon is less than half that of
the national mean"); Matthew J. Macario, Punitive Damage Awards and Procedural Due
Process in Products Liability Cases, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 409, 431 (1995) ("The unwillingness
of the Court to conduct an inquiry [into all of a state's procedures for setting punitive
damage awards] illustrates its larger failure to appreciate the effectiveness of Oregon's
procedural scheme."). Even the Honda Court noted that one of two reasons for the
importance of post-verdict excessiveness review is the fact that jury instructions "typically
leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts." Honda, 512 U.S. at 432.
Pre-verdict constraints limiting broad jury discretion were the strength of Oregon's system.
Id. at 480.
34. Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
35. Had the Court analyzed the total reliability of the damages safeguards in Oregon,
the opinion would not have been as value driven as an application of the Mathews test which
balances state and defendant's interests. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. Instead, the Court
could have just compared the reliability levels of the two procedural systems.
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faulted Oregon for not having a specific compartment-excessiveness

review. The constitutionalization oftradition thus resulted in an insensitivity to the nuances of coordinate state systems.
One can sympathize with the Court's predicament. On the one hand,
it seems somewhat artificial to privilege a certain type of procedure if the
total quantum of protection is the same. On the other hand, figuring out
whether two different procedural systems offer an equivalent amount of
protection presents the Court with a task it is probably ill-equipped to
handle. Any attempt to show the Court which system was most reliable
would be fraught with great uncertainties. For example, how much weight
should one accord to punitive damages generally being lower in Oregon
than in other states given that the contrast might be the result of other
factors? At least theoretically, the Court would not need to inject its own
subjective beliefs into the question of whether or not the two sets of
procedures are equivalent in terms of risk of error. As a practical matter,
however, and given the Court's inability to measure the total reliability of
each system, the Court probably would have to guess. Yet the difficulty
could just as easily suggest the need for deference as the need for uniformity.

36

Moreover, the mere fact that something is a widespread common-law
tradition does not mean it should be considered "fundamental." Indeed,
simply because something is traditional does not necessarily mean that
those who began and continued the tradition felt strongly about it." Even
if the initiators of and those who perpetuated the common-law tradition had
felt strongly about it, a large segment of society at the time may have
opposed it."8 Nor does the great number of states that determined the

36. The Court's presumption of a state system's unreliability on behalf of defendants
facing huge punitive damage awards when it lacks a specific protection contrasts with the
presumption of reliability of hearsay exceptions that work to disadvantage criminal
defendants. See infra note 125.
37. See Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (No. 93-644), in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 15, at 271 (arguing that "excessiveness review, even where
permitted, is not regarded as a fundamental right") [hereinafter Brief of the Trial Lawyers].
38. See Scheiner, supra note 22, at 152 (noting the strong Antifederalist support for a
civil jury was based partly upon the fear "that judges would naturally favor private citizens
or organizations that were part of the ruling elite"). Thus, another uncertainty is how much
significance to accord the persistence of a tradition when a consistent dissenting tradition
exists. For example, Justice Scalia, in dissent, justified the selection of government
employees based upon their political affiliation, with reference to the tradition of the spoils

system. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 94-97 (1990); see supra note 30. As at least
one commentator has pointed out, however, the spoils system was not exactly an
unchallenged American tradition. See Young, supra note 13, at 607 ("Civil service reforms
pursued by the Mugwumps and Progressives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
).
centuries surely converted the spoils system into a challenged political practice ....
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practice was sensible mean that the practice was so fundamental to society
that the public would have wanted to see it inscribed into constitutional
stone.3 9 As one brief argued in Honda, even where judges practiced
excessiveness review prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
"personal injury tort awards and punitive damage verdicts were reviewed
extremely deferentially, if at all. ' 41 Societal toleration of common-law
procedure applied sparingly would not seem to qualify the procedure as a
fundamental tradition. Society's tolerance of the practice might have
depended in fact upon the rarity of the application of the practice. 4'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court treated the common-law tradition of
excessiveness review as a sufficient reflection of fundamental values to

justify constitutionalization. Ultimately, two attributes of this method of
constitutionalization partially justify the move. First, in addition to being
old, a constitutionally privileged tradition seemingly must also be accompanied by a consensus of state courts exceeding the total number of states
necessary for passage of a constitutional amendment. Thus a single state
judge's view could not be constitutionalized. 42 The second justification for

Justice Scalia himself pointed out in his Rutan dissent that segregation merited less deference
as a tradition in part because it had been vigorously challenged on constitutional grounds in
the nineteenth century. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95-96 n.I. Thus, while Justice Scalia argued in
his Rutan dissent for the preservation of a tradition against constitutional interference, in
Honda it was tradition inviting such interference. The criticism of the Rutan dissent and
Honda points out that the persistence of a tradition does not necessarily connote widespread
societal acceptance.
39. This is, of course, even assuming that the practice of post-verdict review of damages
was as widespread as Justice Stevens in Honda suggested it was prior to ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Honda, 512 U.S. at 425. After all, the Court only cited four
pre-Fourteenth Amendment state cases insupport of its claim. Id. Furthermore, three of
these cases were decided early in the nineteenth century, prior to the popular election of state
judges. For example, the Court cited an 1815 New York case; however, New York did not
popularly elect judges until 1846. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 111 (2d ed. 1985). One could thus argue from the record Justice Stevens presents that
judicial review of punitive damage awards-what little of it there was-was primarily an
elitist phenomenon.
40. Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 22, at 12; see also Brief of the Trial Lawyers,
supra note 37, at 11 (noting that Justice Story, in adopting excessiveness review, saw
himself as going to the limits of the Seventh Amendment). Thus, if people at the time saw
anything as fundamental, it was the right to a civil trial by jury.
41. Thus, while the use of tradition may seem to reflect judicial restraint, there is still
room for play in the joints. One's willingness to view a tradition as fundamental may
largely depend upon one's view of the practice itself.
42. It does not follow, however, that one should view the state court consensus as the
equivalent of a constitutional amendment. Constitutional amendments do not simply require
that a given number of people feel a certain way about an issue. Rather, the passage of a
constitutional amendment demands a fervor and commitment totally dissimilar to what is
required for society to accept silently the decisions of state judges on matters of tangential
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this method of constitutionalization is that the persistence of a common-law
tradition requires at least the silent approval of two branches of government. After all, two governmental bodies, the courts and the legislature,
can revise a common-law decision if that decision is inconsistent with
contemporary policy. The courts, however, cannot strike legislative
enactments absent some constitutional error.43 Thus, one might assume
that an unrevised historical practice has met with at least some degree of
popular approval and remains a rational response to contemporary
problems.
In essence, the Court assumes that wisdom at least accompanies inertia.
Justice Kennedy suggested viewing inertia as presumptive wisdom, in slight
contrast to Justice Scalia's resort to history as value-free referent. Justice

Kennedy wrote that "[h]istorical acceptance of legal institutions serves to
validate them not because history provides the most convenient rule of
decision but because we have confidence that a long accepted legal
institution would not have survived if it rested upon procedures found to
be either irrational or unfair."' The question becomes more .complicated
when the Court is confronted with rival traditions that derive from different
lawmaking sources. For example, in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health45 the Court found a liberty interest in the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment based largely upon the general common law

significance to most citizens.
43. But see CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 163-66 (presenting the proposal that courts
should be able to overrule outdated statutes, deriving such power from their common-law
function of keeping the law up to date); see also Quill- v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 732-35 (2d
Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J.,concurring in the judgment) (proposing that an old New York
statute of uncertain constitutionality prohibiting assisted suicide be set aside while allowing
for the possibility of future legislative reenactment), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
Furthermore, an older statute may not attract enough attention to be overruled even if it has
become increasingly anachronistic. Courts may have greater occasion to reevaluate the
wisdom of a certain principle than legislatures, the latter requiring a majority of its members
to change anything. The question, then, is whether this legislative inertia is a larger force
for legal ossification than stare decisis.
44. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 40 (1991). Yet Justice Kennedy's
proposed presumption of wisdom should not necessarily qualify as a presumption of
fundamentality.
However, the Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), also recognized that while
"virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law
jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such
adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced
and justice administered."' Id. at 361-62 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968)). Nonetheless, the Court in Winship went beyond consensus to articulate reasons for
the standard. For example, the Court wrote "[i]t is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned." Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.

45. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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of battery and the more specific tradition requiring informed consent prior
to operating on a patient. The Court reasoned that the "logical corollary
of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses
the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment. ' 46 The Court did not
squarely rule upon the question of whether the Constitution absolutely
protects the right of a competent person to refuse medical treatment.
Justice Scalia's concurrence, however, pointed to longstanding and
widespread statutory proscriptions of suicide and attempted suicide in
arguing against the existence of a constitutional right to die.47
While the constitutionalization of common-law consensus probably
strikes most observers as the most legitimate of the three methods
described in this paper, this method of constitutionalization is still a
problematic choice on its own terms. The Constitution does not explicitly
provide a mechanism for the constitutionalization of common-law
consensus. Nor can one point to any intent of the ratifiers of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment indicating that such consensus should be the
touchstone for due process analysis.48 Once again, this lack of evidence
contrasts markedly with the Seventh Amendment's express incorporation

of common-law tradition.
Moreover, the Court's method in Honda avoids looking arbitrary only
because so many states have adopted and continue to use excessiveness

46. Id. at 270.

47. Id. at 294-95 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). One might argue that Justice Scalia's
approach in Cruzan is inconsistent with the method of adjudication he recommends in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In Michael H., Justice Scalia argued that,
in determining whether a given right has been traditionally protected, one should define the
right at its most specific level. Id. at 127 n.6. Yet in Cruzan, Justice Scalia defined the
right quite generally (in essence, the right to kill oneself) and found a long tradition of
proscribing the general practice. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294-95. One might respond that there
is a significant difference between using tradition to protect a constitutional right (a move
which forecloses future legislative or judicial action) and using tradition to defeat a
constitutional right. This distinction might make functional sense, but Justice Scalia himself
does not make it. Rather, when arguing in Michael H. that his approach was not novel, he
pointed to cases where the Court examined traditions at their most specific level where the
tradition only would have served to defeat the constitutional right. Michael H., 491 U.S.
at 127 n.6 (referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Cruzan thus presented the
question of when a statutory and a common-law tradition collide, which should yield.
48. "Mhe topic of due process apparently received little more attention in the debates
over ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment than it received in the debates concerning the
Fifth Amendment... ." Greenberger, supra note 13, at 993 n.52. Moreover, the assumption
that due process also meant "The Law of the Land" does not help, given that prior to the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the "Law of the Land" encompassed the laws of
the states. How many states constituted the "Law of the Land?" In contrast, the
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause would have necessitated the
examination only of those British practices that were carried over to America.
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review. If, however, a larger number of states failed to adopt the procedures, the Court would need more than the majority of states that adopted
the procedure to justify imposing it upon the minority.49 Generally in our
federal system, the popularity of a practice, especially when that practice
reflects nothing more than the views of state judges, is not enough to
impose it upon a lone holdout.5" What is ultimately troubling, however,
about the constitutionalization of common-law tradition is that it tells a
state to adopt a particular practice without any theory of why that practice
is so fundamental or any historical evidence that society viewed the
practice as fundamental. However, the assumption that the persistence of
a common-law tradition without more reflects a fundamental constitutional
or social value is not the obvious point that the Court seems to think it is.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMMON-LAW HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND THE COMMON LAW AS JUDICIAL COMPROMISE

Prior to the codification of the rules of evidence in the mid-1900's, the
law governing the admission of hearsay was essentially the province of the
common law.' This division of labor made a great deal of sense. Given
that the everyday job of trial courts is to ascertain the factual truth so that
they can properly apply the substantive law, one would expect that the
institutional experience of the judiciary would be the -best guide for
structuring the fact-finding process.
Until the mid- to late-1960s, the Constitution seemingly placed few
strictures upon the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials. However,
at that point the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause re-emerged to
threaten the hegemony of the common law and, increasingly, evidence
codes in this area. 2 As defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay

49. The Court has not really had to face the line-drawing problem of how many states
must adopt a practice before it can be considered a constitutional principle. Nonetheless, the
theoretical possibility of such a problem arising gives a slightly artificial feel to this mode
of constitutionalization, albeit one that might not be avoidable. See Note, supra note 25, at
1318-19 (seemingly arguing that the adoption by the "vast majority of states" of some form
of excessiveness review in capital cases should suffice to make such review constitutionally
required).
50. At the very least, the imposition of the views of some states upon another
traditionally has required the expense of political effort necessary to pass a constitutional
amendment or preemptive federal legislation.
51. See JoAnne A. Epps, Passing the Confrontation Clause Stop Sign: Is All Hearsay
Constitutionally Admissible?, 77 KY. L.J 7, 14 (1988-89) ("Though there were consistent
themes, the several states and the federal government relied on their own perceptions of their
respective common law to formulate rules of evidence.").
52. The Court also developed exclusionary rules which prevent the introduction of
evidence resulting from violations of the Fourth and Fifth amendments. See, e.g., Miranda
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is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."53 The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause requires that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...be
confronted with the witnesses against him ....
The historical record provides little direct evidence of the drafters'
intent for the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court has pointed out
that the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause protect similar values
and are derived from similar roots. 6 Most lawyers assume that the core

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Note that while the
focus of this article is on the constitutionalization of judicial pronouncements, the Court's
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence also utilizes evidence codes and legislatively enacted
evidentiary rules that expand common-law evidentiary rules to limit the right of confrontation. See, e.g., infra notes 71, 73. While this practice may raise somewhat different
concerns from the constitutionalization of common law, both of these practices use nonconstitutionally derived norms to define the contours of a constitutional right.
53. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55. "Courts and commentators agree that history teaches little about the Framers'
intentions for the clause." Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 569 n.46 (1988). One commentator notes that
"[tlhe Clause was barely debated while the Sixth Amendment was under consideration, and
American documents predating the Sixth Amendment rarely discussed the purpose of
confrontation." Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposalfor a ProsecutorialRestraintModel, 76 MINN. L. REV.557, 568 (1992)
(footnote omitted). Nonetheless, Berger writes that the Clause can be understood if viewed
as part of the larger whole of the Bill of Rights rather than studied in isolation. See id. at
568-69; see also Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts,

36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 208-217 (1984) (discussing conflicting historical interpretations of
the Confrontation Clause); S. Douglas Borisky, Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the
CoConspiratorExemptionfrom the HearsayRule and the ConfrontationClause of the Sixth

Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. Rv. 1294, 1301 (1985) ("One of the most significant problems
for a court facing a confrontation clause challenge to the admission of evidence is the
uncertainty surrounding the intent and purposes of the clause.").
56. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)); see also Stanley A. Goldman, Not So
"Firmly Rooted". Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987);
Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational
Testing and CorroborationUnder the ConfrontationClause, 81 VA. L. REv. 149, 150 (1995)

(pointing to Sir Walter Raleigh's trial and conviction by rank hearsay as "halving] driven
[more than any other story] AngloAmerican lawyers to limit the use of hearsay and to ensure
a right of confrontation"); Frank T. Read, The New Confrontation-HearsayDilemma, 45 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 1, 6 (1972). Lilly, however, argued that the more likely source of the impulse
behind the Clause was the colonists' hatred of the British use of vice-admiralty courts "to
punish violators of acts that restricted the colonists' rights of international trade." Lilly,
supra note 55, at 211. These proceedings were conducted under the proceedings of the civil
law and not under traditional adversarial proceedings. Id. Witnesses subject to such
proceedings were examined in closed chambers, and the accused was also denied the right
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/6
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value of confrontation involves the right to cross examine adverse
witnesses to test the reliability of their testimony."
The interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the hearsay context,
however, turns upon one's definition of the phrase "'witnesses against
him."' 58 Read most naturally, the Clause would bar only the unconfronted
testimony of in-court witnesses. While one could read the Clause as a
literal prohibition upon the introduction of an3 hearsay, the Supreme Court
unequivocally rejected this reading. 59 Nor has the Court limited itself to
constitutionalizing only those hearsay exceptions which were recognized
at common law prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. '
Yet the Court also has not limited the Clause's ambit to the right to
cross examine in-court witnesses.61 Nor has the Court adopted the slightly
broader view that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the introduction of
certain formalized testimonial materials such as depositions, affidavits, and
confessions while having nothing to say about all other hearsay.62 Further-

to a jury. Id. at 211-12.
57. "[IThe fundamental value to be preserved by the right of confrontation is
cross-examination, the same value that, according to Wigmore, is the test for determining
whether an item of evidence is hearsay." Read, supra note 56, at 6.
58. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
59. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. ("If one were to read this language literally, it would
require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not present at trial.
But, if thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result
long rejected as unintended and too extreme." (citation omitted)).
60. "[The Court] has rejected any interpretation of the Clause that would treat
confrontation as an absolute right subject only to the exceptions recognized at common law
prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights." Berger, supra note 55, at 593 (citing Boujaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987)); see also Georgia J. linde, Note, FederalRule
ofEvidence 801(d)(2)(E) andthe ConfrontationClause: Closing the Window ofAdmissibility
for CoconspiratorHearsay, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1308 n.108 (1985) (commenting
that such a test is inadequate "because it is unclear how many exceptions were recognized
when the sixth amendment was ratified").
61. See White, 502 U.S. at 359-60 (describing the authority espousing this interpretation); see also 5 JOHN HENRY WiGMORE, EVDmENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397,
at 158 (Chadbourm rev. 1974) ("The rule sanctioned by the Constitution is the hearsay rule
as to cross-examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found, developed,
or created therein."). Justice Harlan challenged Professor Wigmore's reading by pointing
out that it "would have the practical consequence of rendering meaningless what was
assuredly in some sense meant to be an enduring [constitutional] guarantee." California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). To Justice Harlan, it made no
sense that the Framers would constitutionalize the hearsay rule and then allow judges to
gradually eviscerate it with exceptions. Id. In the end, however, Harlan adopted a very
narrow interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. See infra note 62.
62. While agreeing with Professor Wigmore and Justice Harlan's concurrence in the
result in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95 (1970), that the text of the Confrontation
Clause would seem to limit its scope to mandating the cross-examination of in-court
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more, the Court has refused to hold that the Clause demands the production of available witnesses, and consequently, the Court has rejected a
reading of the Confrontation Clause that requires only the production of
available witnesses. 63
Instead of the above interpretations, under the Court's hybrid approach
first announced in Ohio v. Roberts," the Confrontation Clause authorizes
the admission of hearsay only "if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' ' 61 Yet, the Court did not call for an individualized assessment of
each common-law hearsay exception to determine if it exceeded some
constitutionally mandated reliability threshold.'
The Court allowed
reliability to be "inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within afirmly rooted hearsay exception. In all other cases, the evidence
must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."'67

witnesses, Justice Thomas argued that this limitation was inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent and the history surrounding the clause. White, 502 U.S. at 364-65 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In his concurrence, Justice Thomas

chose history over text and argued that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the introduction
of"extrajudicial statements" but "only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." Id. at 365. The
Court's opinion in While rejected the approach as coming "too late in the day." Id. at
352-53; see also Berger, supra note 55, at 563-64. Professor Berger argues that statements
elicited from witnesses by prosecutors or agents of the government merit special scrutiny
under the Confrontation Clause, but he criticizes Justice Thomas for taking a "formalistic
rather than a functional approach to the kind of prosecutorially obtained statements that
would be covered." Id. Furthermore, Berger believes that the Clause should not be limited
only to government-obtained statements, arguing that "other objectives of the Bill of Rights
and the Sixth Amendment support restrictions on hearsay even though the government
played no role in [a statement's] creation." Id. at 563.
63. White, 502 U.S. at 346. Had the Court established the preference for availability,
it would have in effect struck down the part of Rule 803 that states that the availability of
the declarant is immaterial to the admissibility of the twenty-four hearsay exceptions that
come within its ambit. See FED. R. EviD. 803.
64. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
65. Id. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
66. See generally James W. Jennings, Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A
New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1965)
(advocating individualized assessment of hearsay exceptions and finding many traditionally
recognized hearsay exceptions to be too unreliable to satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause).
67. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added). The Court in Roberts also required
prosecutors attempting to admit hearsay to "either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability
of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." Id. at 65. Justice
Harlan suggested the same approach ten years earlier in a concurrence in California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 182 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); he later retracted this suggestion
in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). The
Court in While v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-57 (1992) rejected an unavailability
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A.

What is a Firmly Rooted Exception?

1. The Role of History
Neither the Court's opinion in Roberts nor subsequent opinions
precisely define the characteristics of a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.
So far, the Court has explicitly identified seven such exceptions.68 An
examination of those exceptions, along with other cases declaring certain
exceptions to be firmly rooted, reveals three criteria in search of a theory.

First, the words "firmly rooted" connote historical acceptance. Indeed,
history seemingly plays a significant role in the determination of whether
or not an exception is firmly rooted. For example, in Bourjaily v. United

States69 the Court, determining that the co-conspirator hearsay exception
was finmly rooted, relied upon the fact that "[t]he admissibility of coconspirators' statements was first established in this Court over a century
and a half ago ...,and the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the exception

as accepted practice."70
In addition, in Mattox v. United States71 the Court recognized of dying
declarations that "there could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter
of the [Confrontation Clause].... met from time immemorial they have
3
the
been treated as competent testimony."72 Further, in White v. IllinoisO
Court noted that the "exception for spontaneous declarations is at least two
centuries old... and may date to the late 17th century. 74

Yet history cannot fully explain either the Court's decisions or those

of lower federal courts on this issue. First, the modem version of the
requirement, limiting that aspect of the Roberts holding to its facts. See supra note 63.
68. White, 502 U.S. at 355-56 n.8 (spontaneous declarations and statements made for
the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183
(1987) (a declaration of co-conspirators made in furtherance of the conspiracy); Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66 n.8 (dying declarations, cross-examined prior-trial testimony, business records,
and public records).
69. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
70. Id. at 183 (citing United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827)). But
see Hinde, supra note 60, at 1297 n.37 (noting that certain facts in Gooding distinguish it
from the modem form of the co-conspirator exception).
71. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
72. Id. at 243. "The dying declaration is believed to be the only extant exception to the
hearsay rule at the time the sixth amendment was ratified." Epps, supranote 51, at 14 n.26
(citing FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIxTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATEs 105 (Greenwood Press 1969) (1951)). But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,

178 n.12 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing that Heller's contention "is open to
question" and pointing to the fact that "Wigmore . . . takes the position that several
exceptions to the hearsay rule existed as of the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted").
73. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
74. Id. at 355 n.8 (citation omitted).
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so-called business records exception, recognized by the Court in Roberts,
has its origins in the mid-twentieth century and was not recognized at
common law.75 Moreover, the White Court, even as it noted the age of the
spontaneous declaration exception, relied only on the wide acceptance of
the exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and
did not rely on the age of the exception.76

Additionally, the historical formulation of hearsay exceptions has not
always survived. The Court in Bourjaily eliminated a component of the
common-law exception for co-conspirators' statements that had served to
ensure its reliability. 77 Nevertheless, the Court still deemed the exception

firmly rooted.78
Two other exceptions that the Supreme Court has not considered
illustrate that a hearsay exception need not be grounded in history to be
firmly rooted for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. First, the Federal
Rules establish an exception to the hearsay rule for present sense impressions, which are defined as statements "describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter."7 9 At least two federal courts and
one state court have declared this exception to be firmly rooted for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause." Nonetheless, the historical roots

75. See FED. R. EviD. 803(6) advisory committee's note (tracing the exception back to
the Commonwealth Fund Act adopted in 1936 as a rule for the federal courts and the
subsequent adoption by many states of the similar Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act); see also Hinde, supra note 60, at 1307 n.101 (citing Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517,
519 (N.Y. 1930), for the proposition that the common law excluded business records). In
Hearsay: Business Records and Public Records, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 42, 43 (1982), Glen

Weissenberger stated that the exception "can be traced to the common-law doctrine known
as the 'shop-book' ruIle." Weissenberger also noted, however, that the rule allowed for the
admissibility of such evidence as the account books of merchants only in "certain limited
situations." Id. The nile developed in a way that required whoever prepared the records to
be available or their absence justified, id., a requirement that one cannot find in the
Commonwealth Fund Act or the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. See FED. R.
EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
76. White, 502 U.S. at 355-56 n.8 (1992).
77. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 201 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
A prerequisite to the admissibility of a co-conspirator's statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
is proof of a conspiracy. One question in Bourjaily was whether or not one could rely on
the statement itself to prove the existence of the conspiracy or whether the rule required
independent corroboration. The Court recognized that the rule at common law required
independent evidence but argued that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) changed the rule by
allowing federal courts to use inadmissible evidence to make threshold determinations. Id.
at 177-78.
78. Id. at 183-84.
79. FED. R. EviD. 803(1).
80. See United States v. Vega, No. 84-1355, 1989 WL 95475, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
1989); Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (D.N.J. 1982); State v. Brown, 618 So. 2d
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of the exception are questionable. New York, for example, did not adopt
the exception until 1993.' Explicit judicial recognition of the exception
did not begin until the 1940's."2 Although the exception has its roots in
the older common-law doctrine of res gestae-a "murky" category
encompassing contemporaneous statements in general-courts tended to
emphasize (largely due to the influence of Dean Wigmore) that the
statement had to be made in an excited state to ensure sufficient reliability." Moreover, even today the courts differ on whether a statement of
present sense impression requires corroboration as a prerequisite of its
admissibility.84
Finally, history cannot explain the willingness of several federal courts
to declare the exception for statements against penal interest to be firmly
rooted. s While statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest have
long been admissible at common law,86 the opposite is true for statements

629, 634 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
81. See People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 372 (N.Y. 1993).
82. See 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EvIDENcE § 271, at 212 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); see also Rose Margaret Casey, Developments in the Law.
New York Court of Appeals Adopts the Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule
Against Hearsay, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 285, 294 n.41 (1994) ("[T]he present sense
impression does not share the history of reliability of the firmly rooted exceptions.");
Goldman, supra note 56, at 27 n.107.
83. 2 McCoRMIcK, supra note 82, § 271, at 211.
84. Brown, 610 N.E.2d at 374 (requiring "some additional indicia of reliability" prior
to admitting a present sense impression). The court's opinion also briefly surveys the
corroboration requirements of other jurisdictions, some of which require there be an
"'equally percipient witness,' a witness at the scene who had an equal opportunity to
perceive the event and who will be subject to cross-examination as to the accuracy of the
declarant's statement." Id. at 373 (quoting James B. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case, 15 AM. L
REv. 1, 71 (1881)). Other courts only require "some corroboration." Id.; see also United
States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Under the Federal Rules
a present sense impression need not be corroborated . . . ."); State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d
218, 220 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979) (requiring no corroboration). But see United States v. Blakey,
607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979) (seemingly reading in a corroboration requirement into the
federal rule).
85. A statement against interest, admissible under Federal Rule 804(b)(3) if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness, is
[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject
the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim
by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing
it to be true.
FED. R. Evir. 804(b)(3).
86. "[S]tatements against pecuniary or proprietary interest have long been recognized
[at common law]." Andrew R. Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest
...
and the Confrontation Clause, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 159, 162 (1983) (footnote omitted); see
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against penal interest." Nonetheless, some argue that the distinction,
while historically based, did not make a great deal of functional sense
because one is just as unlikely to tell a falsehood that is against one's penal
interest, as one is to tell a falsehood that is against one's pecuniary
interest.88 The perceived functional equivalence of the penal interest

exception with the more historically accepted pecuniary or proprietary
interest exception has led several federal courts to declare the former to be
"firmly rooted" for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis, serving as
an example of the courts constitutionalizing the analogue of a common-law
hearsay exception. 9
2. Wide Acceptance
The Court seems to find the number of states that have adopted a
particular hearsay exception a relevant factor in determining whether or not
a hearsay exception is firmly rooted. For example, in concluding that the
exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis are firmly rooted, the Court noted that the former was
recognized by the Federal Rules "in nearly four-fifths of the States" and the
latter by an equal number of states." Thirty-nine states have adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence in some form. Thus, if the test for firmly

also 2 McCoRMICK, supra note 82, § 317, at 337-39.
87. "[S]tatements against penal interest-whether exculpatory or inculpatory in
nature-were not well-received at common law in either English or American courts."
Keller, supra note 86, at 162. See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note
(recognizing that the federal rule was eliminating the "common law limitation"); Goldman,
supra note 56, at 35 ("Only in the past two decades have a significant number of jurisdictions broadened the exception to include declarations against penal interest .... ).
88. "[TMhere is no rational distinction between statements against pecuniary and penal
interests in their probabilities of trustworthiness . . . ." Jennings, supra note 66, at 753.
While this statement is probably accurate, it ignores the fact that statements against penal
interest are much more likely to come into play in a criminal proceeding, an arena where our
constitutional system is far less willing to brook error.
89. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 474 n.4 (Ist Cir. 1993); United
States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1364 n.5 (7th Cir. 1991); Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d
1502, 1505-06 (10th Cir. 1991). The Court refused in Lee v. Illinois to allow an accomplice's confession which inculpates a defendant to be categorized as simply a declaration
against penal interest, because this category, said the Court, "defines too large a class for
meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986).
90. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 n.8 (1992).
91. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 to T-3 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin, 2d. ed. 1997) (Alaska, Arizona, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
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rooted requires no more than majority acceptance, the inevitable result will
be the constitutionalization of all the hearsay exceptions in the federal
rules.'
3. Reliability
Even as courts resort to history and the extent of acceptance to
determine whether an exception is firmly rooted, the driving force behind
the deference to those factors purportedly is the concern with the reliability
of statements falling under the exception.93 As the Court stated in Ohio
v. Roberts,94 "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations
that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the

'substance of the constitutional protection."'9 5 The Court's test effectively

treats the inherent reliability of the statement as a proxy for cross examination of the declarant.96
In at least the case of the business records exception, the Court's
willingness to declare the exception to be firmly rooted seemed to derive
principally from the inherent reliability of material admitted under the
exception.97 However, the Court generally derives firmly rooted exceptions from some combination of their history and the statement's reliability
that the Court assumes from the history of the exception. "Admission under
a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement
of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and
legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of
out-of-court statements." 98

Wyoming).
92. See generally Myma S. Raeder, White's Effect on the Right to Confront One's
Accuser, 7 Cium. JUST. 2, 2 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court's "whittl[ing] away the
need to demonstrate unavailability and expansively defined hearsay exceptions as firmly
rooted" may be "the final blow to Confrontation Clause analysis in cases of firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions"). Note, however, that the Court has already declared that Idaho's
equivalent exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) for statements not covered by any
other exceptions, but which the Court determines possess "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" and which are "more probative on the point for which [they
are] offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts," is not firmly rooted. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812 (1990).
93. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 543 (terming "the conviction of a defendant based, at least in
part, on presumptively unreliable evidence" to be the "danger against which the Confrontation Clause was erected").

94. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
95. Id. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
96. Id. at 65.
97. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the business record exception's lack of historical
roots).
98. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817; see also Jonakait, supra note 55, at 578 (suggesting that
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Thus, history and acceptance provide the bases for the conclusion that
certain exceptions are sufficiently reliable so that adversarial testing of the
declarant is unnecessary. The Court does not engage in further analysis of
the reliability of those exceptions once it has deemed the exceptions to be
firmly rooted; nor has the Court ever overtly said that the presumption of
reliability is rebuttable in any individual case."
Courts have been rightly criticized for relying too heavily on the
historical judicial acceptance of an exception and for not relying enough on
the central concern of the Confrontation Clause.'
The most egregious
example of this tunnel vision is the Court's declaration that statements of
co-conspirators constitute a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.' '
As noted above in Part III.A.1, the Bouraily Court focused exclusively
upon the "long tradition" of the exception in declaring it firmly rooted."0 2
The majority did not even mention that the historical use of this exception
did not arise from a perception of its inherent trustworthiness. 3 As the
dissent pointed out, "[b]y all accounts, the exemption was based upon
agency principles, the underlying concept being that a conspiracy is a

if the Court is correct in believing that the promotion of accuracy is the overriding goal of
the Confrontation Clause, "a court should naturally defer to accumulated evidentiary wisdom
when asked if evidence furthers confrontation's mission"). Jonakait's contention is not
necessarily correct, though. A firmly rooted exception that has been accepted because of its
tendency to promote accurate verdicts does not necessarily strike the balance that the
Confrontation Clause requires.
99. But see Goldman, supra note 56, at 8 (arguing that the presumption that firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions are reliable should be rebuttable, yet noting many lower court

cases which seem implicitly to assume that the presumption is irebuttable). Given the
Court's theory that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the
process, it would make sense for the Court to allow a defendant the opportunity to show that
a particular piece of evidence was an exception to the general reliability of the applicable
hearsay exception. Nevertheless, the Court in Bourjaily v. United States stated that "no
independent inquiry into reliability is required" if a statement qualifies as a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). While the issue is perhaps not completely
clear, this article assumes that the presumption of reliability would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to overcome.
100. "Unfortunately, some lower courts have seemed to equate 'firmly rooted' with
'long used.' This equation offends common sense because the vintage of an exception has
little to do with the 'indicia of reliability' of the exception." Hinde, supra note 60, at 1307
(footnote omitted); see also Goldman, supra note 56, at 12 ("However, the concept of firmly
rooted should not be synonymous with longevity. An out-of-court assertion may satisfy the
requirements of a long-observed hearsay exception, yet not necessarily possess sufficient
reliability to meet the requirements of the confrontation clause.").
101. Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 171. Technically, co-conspirator statements are not hearsay
exceptions under the Rules, but instead are defined as "not hearsay." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
102. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183; see also Goldman, supra note 56.
103. Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 188.
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common undertaking where the conspirators are all agents of each' 4other
and where the acts and statements of one can be attributed to all."'
Courts should defer to the historical pronouncements of judges only
when those judges asked the relevant questions. Because the judges who
developed the co-conspirator exception focused on questions that were
unconnected with the basic concern of trustworthiness, which the modem
Court has determined is the fundamental impulse behind the Confrontation
Clause, the long history of the exception should not have been the sole
factor relied on in declaring the exception firmly rooted.
Even where the courts developed exceptions by focusing on relevant
concerns of reliability, many scholars have argued that deference to history
still departs too greatly from the underlying concerns of the Confrontation
Clause.' °s First, the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness which
courts frequently cite to justify the use of various hearsay exceptions are
often aimed only at the risk that a statement might be a lie.' 6 However,
adversarial testing reveals more than just fabrication. Cross-examination
helps the jury assess the significance of any of the "four testimonial
infirmities10 7of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous
memory.'
104. Id. Others, as well, have pointed out that the co-conspirator hearsay exception has
never rested on an inherent trust of such statements. The advisory committee note on the
exception does not attempt to justify the admissibility of such evidence on the basis of its
reliability. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note. Rather, it recognizes the
"agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction" even as it fails to articulate any other
justification for the exception other than it is "the accepted pattern." Id. This is in contrast
to the advisory committee's notes on various other hearsay exceptions which point to the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that underlie each exception. See, e.g., FED. R.
EviD. 803(1) advisory committee's note ("The underlying theory of [the exception for
present sense impressions] is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement
negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation."); see also Hinde, supra
note 60, at 1296-98; Borisky, supra note 55, at 1300, 1304.
105. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 56, at 15 (arguing an exception should be firmly
rooted if "the circumstances prerequisite to admission under that exception realistically
assure a substantial likelihood that virtually any statement offered under it is based on
personal knowledge and is not the product of either faulty recollection, or intentional or
unintentional misrepresentation"); Nesson & Benkler, supra note 56 (arguing for a two-tier
test for firmly rooted hearsay exceptions which would require ajudge to analyze hearsay for
a sound, competent foundation and require corroborating evidence that could be tested);
Jennings, supra note 66, at 746-49 (arguing that hearsay exceptions should not be limited
to those recognized "on an arbitrary date [i.e. ratification of the Sixth Amendment] when the
law was quite unclear," because those original exceptions, even if one assumes that the
Framers considered those exceptions, are not necessarily still constitutional today).
106. For example, the advisory committee note justifies the excited utterance exception
by contending that "circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily
stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication." FED.
R. EvD. 803(2) advisory committee's note.
107. Laurence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay,87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 958 (1974); see
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Second, too much deference to history allows inertia to prevent a
reevaluation of the traditional exceptions based on psychological discoveries or changes in societal attitudes."0 8 Third and finally, one might
simply state, as Green and Nesson have, that the contention that the
guarantee of trustworthiness surrounding the hearsay exceptions renders
cross-examination superfluous is "nonsense."'
4. Summary
While certain obvious themes characterize the Court's jurisprudence
regarding firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, no entirely coherent theory
emerges. For example, reliability seems to be the Court's primary impulse
behind constitutionalizing the business records exception, but the Court
utterly departs from reliability concerns in the context of the co-conspirator
exception. Lower federal courts ignore history and, arguably, reliability
when they constitutionalize both the statement against penal interest and the
present sense impression exceptions.'
Finally, the Supreme Court's
deference to history without a serious reevaluation of the reliability of the

also Goldman, supranote 56, at 28-29 (criticizing the rationales underlying the admissibility
of present sense impressions and spontaneous exclamations); Jennings, supra note 66, at 751
(noting that "[p]sychological studies indicate that excitement may severely impair the
declarant's ability accurately to perceive and communicate"); Note, The Theoretical
Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1786 (1980) (pointing out that
traditional hearsay analysis does not take into account the risk that the jury will overestimate
the reliability of a given statement).
108. See Goldman, supra note 56, at 28-29 (arguing that the rationales for admitting
present sense impressions and spontaneous exclamations "are based on questionable
psychological assumptions"). Goldman points out the reasoning behind those exceptions
depends on the dubious assumption that "descriptive accuracy is a natural consequence of
observation." Id. at 29; see also Jennings, supra note 66, at 748 ("[Judges] should
particularly not rely inflexibly upon categories based upon assumptions which may be
reasonably challenged by objective or psychological tests or upon values which are no longer
dominant in our society.") (footnote omitted); Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision:
Spontaneous Exclamations as a "Firmly Rooted" Exception to the HearsayRule, 23 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 453, 472 (1990) ("The inherent flaws in the rationale underlying the
spontaneous exclamation exception and the unreliability of spontaneous statements dictate
that the exception should not be classified as firmly rooted.").
For example, Nesson and Benkler note that the rationale behind the dying declarations
exception no longer reassures our "culture that only grows more cynical about the
authenticity of religious experience" as it did when "'facing one's Maker' as a moment of
truth" was more deeply ingrained in the national consciousness. Nesson & Benkler, supra
note 56, at 156.
109. ERic D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 569 (2d. ed. 1994).
110. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 86, at 163-64 (discussing reasons why statements
against penal interest traditionally have been deemed unreliable).
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hearsay statements may itself give rise to reliability concerns which
justified the Court's resort to history in the first place.
B. The Common Law as Judicial Compromise
The Court found additional use for the common law in the Confrontation Clause cases. As one commentator wrote in 1971: "Typically,
hearsay exceptions are the product of legislative or judicial action. Neither
is capable of restricting a constitutional right. '11' One might respond that
this assertion simply assumes that the admission of all hearsay violates the
Confrontation Clause. As in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,"' one might
argue the Court is simply using history to flesh out the meaning of an
ambiguous constitutional provision. Nonetheless, the historical consensus
on which the Court relied in Honda is significantly different from the
Supreme Court's use of historical consensus in Confrontation Clause cases.
In cases like Honda, the Supreme Court relies upon history simply
because it is tradition. Indeed, the phrase "due process" easily lends itself
to a principled historical analysis because what one is "due" in the present
may largely depend upon what one was "due" in the past. The Court's
primary failing in Honda was that its opinion did not identify any norm it
was protecting beyond history's shield against arbitrariness.
On the other hand, in Confrontation Clause cases, the Court identified
a norm. Its approach entails a two-step functional analysis in contrast to the
one-step historical analysis of the Honda Court. The Court first notes that
the value to be protected is the reliability of a result, which adversarial
testing helps ensure. Second, the Court defers to the experience of past
judges and legislators on whether certain hearsay exceptions provide the
needed reliability. In the second analysis, the Court looks to the common
law as a source of expertise, not just tradition.
The Supreme Court could have elected to follow another more
formalistic path. Had it adopted either Justice Thomas's view that the
Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of certain formalized testimonial
materials or Wigmore's view that the Clause forbids only unconfronted,
in-court witness testimony, then the Court could have completely avoided
the temptation to constitutionalize the common law. Then, the lack of a
constitutional proscription on admitting hearsay would no more deserve the
description "common-law constitutionalization" than any other practice that
the Constitution does not prohibit. It is the Court's determination that the
admission of hearsay implicates the Constitution that makes its exemption

111. David E. Seidelson, HearsayExceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 76, 91-92 (1971).
112. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
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of common-law hearsay exceptions from constitutional scrutiny so striking.
Instead of choosing the narrow path of historical formalism, the Court
instead articulated a broad constitutional principle infusing the Clause with
a meaning that made the admissibility of hearsay constitutionally suspect.
The Court then abdicated to the common law its role in elaborating that
meaning. By doing so, the Supreme Court also removed the lower courts
from weighing and considering the individual merits of any particular
hearsay exceptions, especially in the case of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. Essentially, the Court compromised.
Indeed, the Court even used the language of compromise to justify its
approach. Sounding like a politician, the Roberts Court pointed to its
"demonstrated success in steering a middle course" as a justification for its
continuing to do so."' The Court further justified its middling approach

by pointing to the lack of scholarly suggestion that the Court's prior
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence had "misidentified the basic interests4
to be accommodated" or been contrary to the intent of the Framers."
The Court noted the lack of a scholarly consensus on the proper course to
take as well as the already rejected prior alternatives such as the WigmoreHarlan approach." 5 Finally, convinced that no magic rule would solve all
problems, the Court "reject[ed] the invitation to overrule a near-century of
jurisprudence.".. 6
The Court's use of the common law thus countenanced compromise in
the face of uncertainty. Mainly out of an aversion to alternatives, the Court
allowed the past experience of judges to form the contours of an explicitly
granted constitutional right. Such a move would prompt less concern if the
Confrontation Clause read, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him to the
extent consistent with the administration of justice." Where the text seems
only concerned with the rights of the defendant, deference to the pronouncements of past judges, whose top priority may not have been the
protection of defendants, may be inappropriate. By compromising, the
Court contracted its articulated constitutional norm. After all, the common
heritage of the rule against hearsay and of the Confrontation Clause does

113. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 n.9 (1980). Interestingly, the Court offers no
indication of what it means by success. Perhaps it regards success as the lack of complaints
about the Court's approach. However, the fact that the Court in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346 (1992), eviscerated Roberts'srequirement that prosecutors demonstrate the unavailability
of declarants prior to admitting the declarant's hearsay testimony indicates all was not
completely well with the Court's approach in Roberts.
114. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 68 n.9. Of course, the Court could not definitively show its
holdings were consistent with the Framers intent, either.
115. See id. (referring to the "mutually critical character of the commentary").

116. Id.
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not mean that all hearsay exceptions are rooted in the same concerns."'
Courts have always demanded a large degree of trustworthiness from
hearsay exceptions, with the possible exception of co-conspirator hearsay.
However, competing institutional considerations have surely made
common-law courts and later legislatures more willing to brook a greater
degree of error than the constitutional protection allows. Judges face
competing pressures such as the need to streamline their dockets and the
concern over excluding possibly probative evidence. ' Thus, the Court
cannot justify its approach by claiming that it is simply deferring to experts
on an essentially factual question, for the question of what hearsay is

reliable enough to pass constitutional muster is inescapably a normative
judgment.
Two administrative law doctrines provide alternative ways to view the
Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. In a sense, just as Congress
must delegate authority in the complex administrative state to solve many
complex problems, the Supreme Court has agreed to defer to the administrative expertise of past courts and legislatures on the question of what
constitutes a reliable hearsay exception. The Constitution limits Congress's
delegation of its congressional authority, although the limitation is almost
never breached." 9 The Court arguably ducks responsibility for the
fundamental choice of setting the constitutional threshold of reliability
necessary for a hearsay statement to be admitted, which the Constitution
exclusively commits to the Court.

117. The hearsay rule and its exceptions have been generated through
common law development and legislative enactment, evolving into a
mind-numbing hodgepodge, a "rule" with more than twenty-five exclusions and exceptions (including a catchall exception) and no clear
underlying standard. As such, the doctrine cannot express a coherent
constitutional principle. Why should this process of development be
accorded absolute constitutional respect in the context of hearsay but in
no other context? The trap of equating the right of confrontation with
hearsay law gives us a constitutional rule that epitomizes legal
technicality, subordinates the Constitution to common-law rules of
evidence, and lacks any clear bounds or coherent rationalization.
Nesson & Bender, supra note 56, at 159.
118. In addition, at least until the 1960s, courts developing hearsay exceptions had no
reason to think that this project implicated the Constitution. Thus, one cannot even say that
the Supreme Court, in declaring firmly rooted hearsay exceptions constitutional, approves
consensus constitutional interpretation. Instead, the Court is merely approving the work of
courts that had no reason to be thinking in constitutional terms.
119. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep'tv. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672
(1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Congress unconstitutionally
delegated to the Secretary of Labor the fundamental choice of "whether the statistical
possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of
preventing those deaths").
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A second analogy from administrative law helps illustrate the
interactive problems caused by an unclear constitutional mandate. In
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' the
Court deferred to an administrative agency's construction of a statute where
congressional intent was unclear and where the agency's construction was
Similarly, the Court in Roberts deferred
within a permissible range.
to common-law courts in response to the Confrontation Clause's vague
mandate."2 The Court, however, did not examine specific firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions to determine if they are permissible constructions of the
Constitution. Moreover, because the lower courts were not interpreting the
mandate when they developed the hearsay exceptions, the Court is not even
upholding an interpretation at all. Accordingly, the former analogy seems
more appropriate although the analogical inadequacy of the second helps
illuminate the problems with the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
Part of the Court's willingness to sanction a transparent compromise
derived from its yearning for bright-line rules and the resulting consistency
and certitude of application that such rules provide."
The beauty of
common-law hearsay exceptions is that they remove the need for courts to
justify their decisions, except to the extent that courts must explain why a
certain statement falls within the letter of the exception. 24 Rules also
limit the power of courts to accomplish their desired results. Indeed, even
as the Court expanded the power of the judiciary by rejecting Justice
Thomas's formalistic approach to the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme
Court limited the extent of its acquisition of power for itself and other
judges by mandating deferral to the opinions of their historical counterparts

on the admissibility of certain types of hearsay.
It is axiomatic that bright-line rules have their costs."'

Their

120. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
121. Id. at 843.
122. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
123. The promulgation of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions "responds to the need for
certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials." Id. at 66.
124. A similar advantage is that distinct rules make it easier to determine what the law
is. This reasoning intersects one of the arguments for codification of evidentiary rules. See
Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify--That is the Question: A Study of New
York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641, 664-81 (1992).
125. Suppose, for example, that the application of a hearsay exception admits probative
pro-prosecution evidence 90% of the time and unprobative pro-prosecution evidence 10%
of the time. Suppose further that a rule requiring a case-by-case determination of probity
admits the probative evidence only 70% of the time, never admits unprobative evidence, and
significantly increases transaction costs. Finally, suppose that both the failure to admit
probative evidence and the admission of unprobative evidence, as well as the exclusion of
probative evidence, results 50% of the time. The rule would result in a 5% false conviction
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creation often helps save time and resources but at the expense of accuracy;
however, acceptance of such rules means a willingness to accept the latter
costs. Part of the Court's willingness to sacrifice accuracy in the case of
rights to confrontation may be the result of its own historical role in
establishing evidentiary rules as well as its own role in the eventual
codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In that sense, the Court has
an institutional stake in trusting and perpetuating its own past pronouncements.
When examining the terms of the Court's compromise, one may
cynically observe that the Court is willing to compromise on the additional
value that it has recognized as undergirding the confrontation right because

history is unclear that the Confrontation Clause is about anything more than

"ex-parte affidavits" or the right to cross-examine in-court witnesses: The
Court's jurisprudence in this arena is tentative; the Court rocked the boat,
but only in areas where it felt the waters clearly allowed it to do so. Yet

when the Court reached the rockier waters of the common law, the Court
abandoned the ship rather than attempting to tame the waters in a shaky
boat.
The imprecise definition of the confrontation right also allowed for this
common-law compromise without the appearance that the Constitution was
actually being judicially amended by a previously understood constitutional
meaning126 The constitutionalization of the common law seemed less

rate (over a 0% false conviction rate under the standard) coupled with a 10% decrease in the
false acquittal rate as well as a significant decrease in transaction costs.
The Constitution necessarily allows for a risk of false convictions. After all, the
prosecution must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not no doubt at all. However,
there is something distinct and troubling about the way that error is accepted in the
confrontation area. The risk that one will be convicted despite innocence because there was
only unreasonable, albeit accurate, doubt is the risk that every defendant must face under the
Constitution. The Constitution guarantees every defendant no more than the right to a
certain burden of proof. Every defendant theoretically faces the same risk ex-ante. The
Confrontation Clause, however, is supposed to accord the right to confront each person, thus
ensuring the reliability of evidence. The Court allows for exceptions where the right to
confront would be essentially superfluous. Yet these exceptions are not 100% reliable. The
approach, therefore, ensures ex-ante that some defendants will have to bear the full brunt of
the rule. The Court is willing to accept this fact to avoid the costs of constitutionalizing
every evidentiary decision. It would obviously not be acceptable for a court to deny the
right to cross-examine to every tenth defendant who comes before it. Yet, this is essentially
what the Court does when it says that the court may automatically admit evidence that will
only be reliable in 90% of cases 100% of the time. It is an aggregate approach to what is
supposed to be an individualized process.
126. The appearance of compromise is reinforced when one considers that the only
reason that firmly rooted hearsay exceptions have had the time to become firmly rooted is
because the Supreme Court has only recently begun interpreting the Confrontation Clause
in the way it presently does.
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radical because the right was being defined at the same time as the exceptions. One might also say that the Court was making practical a right that
reality could not have supported if it entailed the elimination of all
common-law hearsay exceptions. In other words, the acceptance of firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions was the political price that members of the Court
paid to abandon the constricted interpretation of Wigiore and Harlan.
Moreover, the Court's alternatives were not especially attractive. Had
the Supreme Court eliminated all hearsay exceptions and articulated a
general standard of reliability for courts to follow each time hearsay was
introduced as evidence, the Court would have removed state courts from
very familiar moorings and overruled the way states had been putting
people in jail for over a century-without compelling evidence that the old
methods had been unjust or unconstitutional. Furthermore, both the
increased litigation costs and the inconsistency of application would have
been inevitable.1 7 Even this application inconsistency could not have
been resolved by the Supreme Court because of its fact-specific nature.'
As an alternative the Court conceivably could review each hearsay
category to determine if it possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 29 Such an approach would necessitate
either the articulation of an arbitrary and unmeasurable threshold of general

reliability beyond which the Constitution sanctions the occasional

127. One need only look to the experience of the courts with the residual hearsay
exception to see the problems of such an approach. Among the prerequisites to admissibility
under this exception is that the statement must possess "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" to the other hearsay exceptions. FED. R. EvID. 803(24). One
commentator pointed out that the requirement of the residual hearsay exception is similar to
the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required by the Constitution when a
hearsay statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See Major
Timothy W. Murphy, CorroborationResurrected: The Military Response to Idaho v.
Wright, 145 MIL. L. REv. 166, 171 (1994) (quoting United States v. Hines, 23 M.J. 125,
135 (C.M.A. 1986)). A major problem with the application of the residual hearsay exception
is "its lack of any certainty, uniformity, or predictability. This has created a great deal of
doubt about the rule against hearsay. As a result preparation for trial has become more
difficult because attorneys can no longer be certain whether an out-of-court declaration is
inadmissible." James E. Beaver, The Residual HearsayException Reconsidered,20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 787, 800 (1993).
128. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989) (noting that the establishment of standards diminishes the Supreme Court's role
in deciding what the law is and subsumes uniformity to other priorities).
129. See Goldman, supra note 56, at 15 (suggesting that, if there is no opportunity to
question the declarant, an exception "can be constitutionally classified as firmly rooted only
if... the circumstances prerequisite to admission under that exception realistically assure
a substantial likelihood that virtually any statement offered under it is based on personal
knowledge and is not the product of either faulty recollection, or intentional or unintentional
misrepresentation"). Goldman further argues that the presumption of constitutionality should
be rebuttable for statements that fall within a firmly rooted exception. Id. at 47.
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admission of unreliable evidence or, as Professor Goldman proposed, a
high standard of admissibility that few exceptions could meet.'3 ° Moreover, applying reliability analysis to an entire category of exceptions would
not eliminate the aggregative approach to what is supposed to be an
individual right.
Even as the Court lost legitimacy points because of the evident
interpretative difficulties of its approach, the political costs would have
been greater if it overruled centuries of evidence jurisprudence in the face
of an uncertain historical record. Had the historical record been more clear
about the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, then this approach would
have been a clear abdication of the Court's constitutional responsibility.
But because the record lacked clarity, one cannot be certain that the
Court's approach was the wrong one. In effect, the Court selected an
almost certainly inadequate approach, over a possibly erroneous one that
has greater interpretative coherence but potentially more drastic consequences for the law of evidence.
The Court has not always taken the more timid and restrained road.
Indeed, in the past the Court demonstrated that the resort to common-law
consensus for the interpretation of a vague constitutional norm is far from
inevitable. In the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,' the
Supreme Court declined to allow aspects of common-law libel and defaination define the scope of the press's freedom to criticize public officials.'
Instead, the Court created a whole new series of tests designed to ensure
that the common law not confound what it viewed as the fundamental
values of the First Amendment.

130. One could fault the Court for not explicitly making the presumption of reliability
for a firmly rooted hearsay exception rebuttable, although that would have resulted in

case-by-case adjudication. Id. at 47.
131. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
132. Id. Ironically, to demonstrate that one should not read the text of the Confrontation Clause as eliminating common-law hearsay exceptions, Professor Wigmore finds support
in the analogy of defamatory statements and the Free Speech Clause. WIGMORE, supra note
61, § 1397, at 158.
Having just argued that the right to confrontation was essentially the right to crossexamination and thus the right "to have the hearsay rule enforced," he wrote:
Now the hearsay rule is not a rule without exceptions .... There were
a number of well-established ones at the time of the earliest constitutions, and others might be expected to be developed in the future. The
rule had always involved the idea of exceptions, and the constitutionmakers indorsed the general principle merely as such. They did not
attempt to enumerate exceptions; they merely named and described the
principle sufficiently to indicate what was intended... just as the brief
prohibition against 'abridging the freedom of speech' was not intended
to ignore the exception for defamatory statements.
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The Court's language and approach in New York Times contrasts

markedly with its deference to the common law in the Confrontation
Clause cases. The Court declared that "libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment."1 33 Thus, the Court required plaintiffs
who were public officials seeking to recover damages for defamatory
statements to prove that an allegedly defamatory statement "was made with
'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."' 34 The rule altered the common-law framework which allowed for presumptions both of malice and
falsity. 35 While eleven state courts had, at the time of the decision,
previously adopted the Supreme Court's requirement, the approach was
nonetheless the minority view.'36 Subsequent cases also eliminated
certain components of common-law private libel as well, including the
common-law37 rule imposing strict liability for false statements about private
individuals.
133. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
134. Id. at 279-80.
135. While the language of the New York Times Court is not perfectly clear about
whether courts may constitutionally require a defendant to prove falsity, the Court later read
the New York Times case to require that the plaintiff establish that the statement was false.
See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); see also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No
LAW: THm SULL vAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

120 (1991)

(noting such a rule

rejects "the common-law presumption of falsity"); Brief for the Petitioner at 54, New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39), in 58 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMEMS
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTIrTUONAL LAW (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner, New York Times v.
Sullivan]; Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (requiring
plaintiff prove malice by clear and convincing evidence).
136. Brief for the Petitioner, New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 135, at 54
(conceding that scholars viewed the actual malice requirement as the minority, though
superior, view); see also Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53
U. CHI. L. REv. 782 (1986).
The proposition [that requires a public official bringing a defamation
claim to prove actual malice] stands in very sharp opposition to the
majority common law position on the same question, which drew a line
between statements of fact, for which liability was strict if the statements were false, and statements of opinion, which were generally
privileged absolutely because they are incapable of being either true or
false.
Id. at 795-96.
137. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding states could
not impose liability without fault for false statements about private individuals). "The old
common law of libel, which was still the law in most states when Gertz was decided in
1974, included no such requirement." LEIs, supra note 135, at 195. Furthermore, in

PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986), the Court eliminated
the presumption of falsity in cases involving private plaintiffs, at least where the speech at
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However, the Court in New York Times did not find an absolute right
to criticize public officials as advocated by the petitioners and Justices
Black and Goldberg.'
The Court compromised by according some
measure of constitutional respect to the value of reputation-even for
public officials." 9 The difference is that the New York Times Court
largely moved away from the common law for its compromise, whereas the
Confrontation Clause cases embraced the common law. The New York
Times Court viewed the constitutional norm to be protected as separate
from the common law. The Confrontation Clause cases, however, used the
common law to limit the norm and assumed that the common law had
struck the correct balance.'40 Moreover, in New York Times the Supreme
Court chose not to defer to the states' efforts to strike a balance despite
that the common law had historically balanced the concern for freedom of
expression with that of reputation.' 4 ' The Court deferred, however, to the
results of the common law's balancing test in the Confrontation Clause
cases, presuming that the concerns which motivated the common-law courts
were the same that drove the Confrontation Clause. The result of these

issue concerns public matters, and the private plaintiff is suing a media defendant. "The
decision reversed the common-law rule, which made a libel defendant prove a challenged
statement true." LEWIS, supra note 135, at 195.
138. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 293-305.
139. See LEwis, supra note 135, at 119 ("Reputation was a value deserving of respect,
too, and over many years the law had respected it despite the First Amendment's strong
commitment to free speech.").
140. One potential difference in the positions of the New York Times Court and, for
example, the Roberts Court, is that the former was able to rely upon the historical reaction
to the Sedition Act to help define the contours of the right. See New York Times, 376 U.S.
at 273-77. The Court wrote in New York Times that the controversy over the Sedition Act
"first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment." Id.
at 273. No such historical event in the early Republic was available to help define the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause (although many argue that the Confrontation Clause
drafters drew their inspiration from the injustice of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh). See
supra note 56. On the other hand, the meaning of freedom of the press at the time of
founding the Constitution is hardly obvious. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 136, at 788 nn.14
& 17 (suggesting the First Amendment incorporated Blackstone's view that freedom of the
press was limited to freedom from prior restraint). Moreover, the Sedition Act was not
officially declared unconstitutional until New York Times, although many have assumed the
Act's unconstitutionality from the time of its passage until the New York Times decision.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273-77. The Court, however, had no similar history
illuminating the spirit of the Confrontation Clause. Thus, there would have been little to
bolster the legitimacy of an attempt by the Court fully to overturn traditional hearsay
doctrine.
141. "[T]he common law operates from a deep conviction in the importance of freedom
of speech . . . ." Epstein, supra note 136, at 791. Epstein also points to areas where the
common law protected speech, including the "absolute protection" for critical opinion of
iublic figures. Id. at 791 n.21.
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differing approaches has been an ongoing role for the Court in elaborating
judicially created First Amendment standards for libel, defamation, and
privacy, while escaping the role of monitoring a significant area of
evidence law. Indeed, the Court's retreat from the common law in First
Amendment issues ironically necessitated the Court's subsequent slow
elaboration of common-law standards. The Court in Roberts turned to the
common law to avoid case-by-case decision making.
In the end, the New York Times decision provides the more satisfying
result, at least from an interpretative perspective, because the courts using
that approach actually wrestle with a constitutional principle. The
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is troubling because the Court faltered

at the threshold of enunciating its own principle and called on the common
law to prop itself up. The problem with Roberts was not that it invoked
the common law to define the constitutional norm, but that it constitutionalized the common law despite the apparent tension with the norm the
Court previously articulated. Further, the Court did not satisfactorily
explain why it trusted the common law to strike the proper balance. One
might argue that the Court is simply reluctant to overrule what is firmly
rooted. But the Court did not simply give the common law the benefit of
the doubt on whether it passed the constitutional test. Instead, without
providing any good reason why, the Court did not require the common law
to take the test at all. While the legitimacy of the common law helped hide
the interpretative difficulties with the Court's approach, a look behind the
shine does not by itself inspire confidence in the Court's ability to resolve
interpretative uncertainty in a principled manner.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATE NUISANCE LAW AND THE
COMMON LAW AS METHODOLOGICAL CONSTRAINT
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg'42 and the Confrontation Clause cases,
the constitutionalization of common law resulted in federal constitutional
standards applying to all citizens.' 43 Indeed, the common conception of
a constitutional right is one that protects all citizens equally no matter
where they reside. An act that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
one state should constitute cruel and unusual punishment in another-just

142. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
143. Note that a few courts and at least one commentator have found it relevant to
comment on whether or not a hearsay exception is firmly rooted in a particular jurisdiction.
See Casey, supra note 82, at 293 ("It is submitted that the present sense impression
exception is not firmly rooted in New York."); see, e.g., State v. Dorcey, 307 N.W.2d 612,
617 (Wis. 1981) ("The exception which allows the admission of hearsay statements made
by a co-conspirator is well-rooted in Wisconsin law."). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
given no indication that one's confrontation rights may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
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as Due Process or Confrontation Clause violations are judged by the same
standard in all states.
However, under the Supreme Court's longstanding deference to state
conceptions of property and the framework established in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,'" one's right to compensation under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, at least theoretically, is a function
of one's address. In 1986 David Lucas purchased two residential coastal
lots in South Carolina for just under one million dollars.' Two years
later the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation that prevented
him "from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two
parcels,"'" and Lucas sued the state. The trial court found that these
restrictions rendered Lucas's parcels valueless and ordered the state to pay
just compensation. 47 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that the state owed no compensation when its regulation was designed to
prevent serious harm to the public.'48
After the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, the

Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. If a regulation deprives
an owner's property of all "economically beneficial use," the Court ruled
that the State must compensate the owner unless the restriction
inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must,
in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or
other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise. 49

144. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
145. Id. at 1006.
146. Id. at 1007.
147. Id. at 1009.
148. Id. at 1009-10 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424, 424

S.E.2d 484 (1992)).
149. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. The requirement that a regulation must deprive property
of all economically beneficial use before the Court will consider it a categorical taking has
arguably engendered even more scholarly debate and criticism than this section's subject,
the nuisance exception. See, e.g., William W. Fisher In, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1393, 1402-05 (1993) (arguing that the problem of defining the relevant parcel that
a regulation has deprived of all value will only add to the arbitrariness of the law of
takings); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (1993) (arguing that the "line between total
and partial takings is relevant only to the question of how much compensation is required,
not to whether there is a basic obligation to compensate"). One aspect of this discussion is
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While the Court considered it "unlikely that common-law principles
would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land," the Court remanded the case to the South
Carolina Supreme Court to give the state the opportunity to "identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses
he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found."' 50 On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the
South Carolina Coastal Council failed to "persuade[] us that any common
law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas's desired use of his land;
nor has our research uncovered any such common law principle.''
The
52
court then ordered compensation for the temporary taking.
One difference between Lucas and the other cases discussed in this
article is that in Lucas, the Court constitutionalized each state's individual
common law rather than some common-law consensus. Consequently and
unlike the cases discussed in Parts II and III, the Lucas decision allows
current state courts to establish constitutional parameters in their role as
gradual expositors of background state common law.
These differences will be discussed in the next section and are not
especially remarkable. The Court has historically utilized state definitions
of property when construing the Takings Clause. What is most noteworthy
about the Court's use of the common law in Lucas is that the court
privileged common-law restrictions over statutory ones and used the
common law to avoid articulating a novel constitutional standard.
A.

Common Law as Background Expectations

As the majority points out, the result in Lucas is largely unremark-

relevant to the subject of this article, and it relates to the so-called parceling or "denominator" problem. The problem is illustrated by the following example: If a state enacts a

regulation which only allows building on one half of a person's 100-acre parcel but forbids
it on the other half, has one's 50-acre property been deprived of all value, or has one's 100acre property been deprived of one half of its value? In dictum, Justice Scalia suggested that
"the answer" to the parceling problem might also
lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the
State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law
has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest
in land with respect to which the taldngs claimant alleges a diminution
in (or elimination of) value.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7. Thus, the Court might in the future resort to constitutionalizing
state common law in the area of defining the scope and size of property interests.
150. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
151. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424, 427, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486
(1992).
152. Id.
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able.'53 In essence, the opinion by Justice Scalia holds that the state
cannot owe compensation for taking something that the property owner
never actually owned. Because the Constitution provides for no baseline
definition of property, the Court generally must look to "existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law" to
ascertain the scope of property rights.154
If a state's background rules of property forbid certain uses, then those
restrictions, such as common-law nuisance restrictions, "inhere in the title
itself,"' 55 and the property owner purchases the property subject to those
conditions.' 56 Nonetheless, the body of state-created expectations and
restrictions that inhere in the title to property has seldom set the limits of
the state's ability to regulate. Indeed, as Justice Holmes suggested in 1922,
the question of whether a certain restriction inheres in the title is distinct
from the question of whether the restriction falls within the ambit of the
legislative police power.'57
Even ignoring this precedent, a theory of expectations ultimately does
not fully explain or justify Justice Scalia's resort to common-law const-

153. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
154. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See Henry
Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property",62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 435 (1977) (noting
that the Due Process clause itself does not create property interests, and instead those
interests are found principally in state law). Although Roth involved a procedural due
process claim against a state entity, it is clear that state definitions of property combined
with the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against uncompensated takings, limit the federal
government's power as well as the power of the states. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (failing to find a taking, yet holding that the Fifth
Amendment protects trade secrets recognized under state law as property from uncompensated appropriation by the federal government).
155. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
156.
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with. This accords
... with our 'takings' jurisprudence, which has traditionally
been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding
the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of
rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property.
Id. at 1027 (footnote omitted).
157. "[l]f, from what we may call time immemorial, it has been the understanding that
the burden exists, the land owner does not have the right to that part of his land except as
so qualified and the statute that embodies that understanding does not need to invoke the
police power." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). This quote, from
Justice Holmes, the father of regulatory takings doctrine, see Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922), suggests that the legislative power to regulate land use has historically
been analyzed separately from the expectations of property owners.
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itutionalization. As Professor Tribe argues, the "[expectations] path is a
circular one inasmuch as expectations are themselves subject to governmental manipulation. ... Without appeal to such concerns [as regularity,

autonomy, and equality], we are defenseless against the alluring but fatal
argument that, since it is the government that gives, government is free to
take away as well."' 8 In other words, unless one is willing to give the
state nearly limitless power to manipulate property rights and eviscerate the
Takings Clause at least as applied to the states, one must resort to norms
other than expectations to define property rights for purposes of the
Takings Clause."5 9
However, an earlier opinion by Justice Scalia in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission16' demonstrated the Court's clear unwillingness to
adopt such a stripped-down view of the Takings Clause. In Nollan Scalia
indicated that statutory constraints, even those applied only to owners who
purchased property after the enactment of the statute, are not restrictions
that inhere in the title.' 6' The plaintiffs in Nollan purchased their
property after the Commission began to implement its policy of conditioning building permits for certain beach front property on the grant of an

158. LAURENCE H. TRmE, AMERIcAN CONSTrIUIONAL LAwv 608-09 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnote omitted).
159. See WiLLLAM A. FIsCHEL, REGULATORY TAmKNGs: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLrTCS 183 (1995) ("Rational expectations theory holds that landovmers should have seen
the taking coming and so should not expect compensation. This is shown by logic and
history to be an unsatisfactory application of a good positive theory to thoroughly normative
territory."); see also Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S.CAL.L. REV.
1393, 1521 (1991).
Expectations analysis represents takings law's effort to assure the
citizenry that plans based on existing law will not be disrupted unless
compensation is paid. This project cannot be completed if only because
government must retain the flexibility to change laws without incurring
the massive transaction costs of compensating for every change. But
neither can it be abandoned, unless property is to lose its place as the
constitutional right that protects minority holdings against changing
majority views.
The challenge for the Court then is to find a substantive, normative
way to differentiate between expectations based on existing law that
will receive constitutional protection and expectations based on existing
law that will not.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
160. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
161. Id. at 834 n.2. In Nollan the California Coastal Commission began to implement
a policy that conditioned building permits for certain beach front property upon a grant of
an easement across the property. Id. at 828-29. The Court ultimately found that if the
government wanted the easement it had to compensate the owners, and the government could
not constitutionally avoid payment by imposing such a condition upon the owners of the
property. Id. at 841-42.
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easement to the public.162 However, the Nollan Court found the chronology irrelevant to the question of the state's obligation to compensate and
wrote: "So long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior
owners of the easement without compensating them, the prior owners must
be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the
lot."'"
A broad reading of this quote from Nollan would suggest that
prospective statutory or administrative use restrictions do not inhere in the
title of property as do common-law restrictions, a distinction that is
inexplicable if the only goal is to protect the expectations of the purchaser. I" In addition, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lucas determined that
"[t]he Court's references [in Lucas] to 'common-law' background principles
... indicate that legislative determinations do not constitute 'state nuisance
165
and property law' for the Court."'

162. Id. at 834 n.2.
163. Id. Thus, the Court prevents the state from invoking a "moving to the taking"
defense for use whenever property is purchased after a regulation has gone into effect. For
commentary offering a similar justification for the rejection of the defense, see FISCHEL,
supra note 159, at 193-95. The defense is based upon the notion that property owners who
purchase property after a regulation has gone into effect have already been compensated for
their loss by the lower price of the property. Fischel argues, however, that this is simply
"[]ooking for takings at the wrong moment in time" because it ignores the prior owner's
right to compensation and makes that right essentially inalienable if a subsequent purchaser
cannot take advantage of it. Id. at 194.
164. Suffice it to say, however, that if the only question is expectations, the attempt at
distinction at the very least ignores the historical role that the legislature has played in
identifying and proscribing nuisances. See infra note 177.
165. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1052 n.15 (1992). An
Iowa court in Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994), questionably interpreted the
Lucas Court's reference to "background principles" of property to encompass statutory
restrictions in effect when the plaintiff purchased the property. In Hunizker the plaintiffs had
purchased their property twelve years after passage of a statute authorizing the state
archaeologist to deny permission to exhume important archaeological remains. Id. at 371.
When the archaeologist later discovered the presence of important remains on the plaintiff's
property, the plaintiffs were effectively denied permission to build upon their property. The
court, however, found that "at the time the plaintiffs acquired title, the State, under existing
state law, could have prevented disinterment. This limitation or restriction on the use of the
land inhered in the plaintiffs' title." Id.
One commentator writes that the "most significant question that remains unanswered
by Lucas is whether land-use regulations... already in place prior to the purchase of the
land, create such an implied limitation." Andrew R. Mylott, Is There a Doctrine in the
House?: The Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause Has Been Mortally Wounded by
Lucas, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1299, 1323 (1992); see also William Funk, Revolution or Restatement?: Awaiting Answers to Lucas' Unanswered Questions, 23 ENVTL. L. 891, 896 (1993)
(discussing the issue of Lucas's application to prospective statutory restrictions). Neither the
Hunziker court nor Mylott, however, address footnote 2 of the Court's opinion, discussed
supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text, nor do they deal with the tone of the Court's
opinion in Lucas or the dissent's view of the majority opinion.
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Courts could also distinguish between two types of statutes. The
Nollan-type statute imposes a use restriction directly upon certain property.
The Hunziker-type statute imposes a generalized risk that the legislature
will impose a use restriction on a landowner's property if a certain event
occurs that is beyond that landowner's control, for example, the discovery
of archaeological remains. If the former type of regulation went uncompensated for subsequent purchasers, then the impact would be felt immediately.
Given that the owner could now only sell the property for less value
because of the restriction, the current owners would feel the incentive to
claim compensation for the use at the time of the enactment of the regulation--even if they had no intention previously of taking advantage of that
particular use. A more sensible system would allow subsequent purchasers
to seek compensation so that the current owners would not feel the rush to
do so before the use restriction truly affected them.
The latter type of statute, however, only adjusts property value for the
risk of regulation. No similar incentives would be present because no
particular property would be targeted. The only thing taken would be the
loss of value deriving from the risk of future appropriation. Assuming this
risk was spread evenly among property owners, property owners would
rationally forego compensation for the minimal impact because they would
otherwise be taxed for the compensation system and would have to pay for
legal counsel to seek compensation. Moreover, the minimal impact of such
a regulation on everyone's property is not the type of loss with which the
Takings Clause traditionally has been concerned.
All purchasers would then acquire their property at a slightly lower
price as ex ante compensation for the statutory risk (and then could insure
against the risk). Still, while this is a distinction between the statutes in
Hunziker and Nollan, this distinction would allow legislatures to pass
general statutes stating that all property shall be subject to the risk of
random appropriation. While such statutes impose only a general risk of
regulation on everyone's property, this is clearly not what the Court had in
mind. If the only question is expectations, then the attempt at distinction
at the very least ignores the historical role that the legislature has played
in identifying and proscribing nuisances.
Justice Kennedy suggested an expectations-based approach to the
problem, but did not confine expectations simply to the common law; he
wrote, "Property is bought and sold, investments are made, subject to the
State's power to regulate."'" Recognizing the circularity of the analysis,
he nonetheless argued that the "expectations protected by the Constitution
are based on objective rules and customs that can be understood as

166. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (concurring).
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reasonable by all partes involved." 67 However, "[t]he common law of
nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a
complex and interdependent society."' 8
One cannot reconcile Justice Scalia's opinions in Nollan and Lucas
with a pure expectations-based conception of property. Yet Justice Scalia
explicitly refused in Lucas to articulate a general unified theory of nuisance
principles as Professor Epstein urged the Court to do in an amicus brief

submitted in the Lucas case.'69 Instead, Scalia opened the door to the
possibility that other common-law doctrines inhere in the title by referring
to "background principles of nuisance and property law."'7 Furthermore,

167. Id. at 1035.
168. Id. But see Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 277-78 (1992) (criticizing
Justice Kennedy's approach in Lucas as "untenably vague"). One might note, however, that
nuisance law is itself hardly crystal clear. Indeed, it is a cliche among legal commentators,
when writing about nuisance, to refer to Dean Prosser's description of the area as "an
impenetrable jungle." See, e.g., Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law
of PublicNuisance: A Comparison with PrivateNuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54
ALB. L. REv. 359, 359 (1990).
169. Professor Epstein's brief seems to argue for a more normative conception of
nuisance with the goal being to "maximize the joint value of all resources owned by the
parties to the dispute." Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453),
reprinted in Richard A. Epstein, Ruminations on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
An Introduction to Amicus Curiae Brief, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1233, 1246 (1992).
Moreover, in another article, Epstein criticizes Justice Scalia's "resortl to reasonable
expectations, rather than the definition of nuisance, to define the limits of the police power."
Epstein, supra note 149, at 1378. Epstein sets forth his normative definition of nuisance
more fully in Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints,8 J. LEGAL
STuD. 49 (1979).
170. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. For example, the state court in Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993), determined that the common-law doctrine of
custom qualified as a background principle, and thus the plaintiffs never had the right that
they claimed was taken. Furthermore, commentators argue that Lucas will have little impact
on certain types of state regulation because of background principles of state property law
beyond the law of nuisance. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court
Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal BarrierBeaches, 19 HARV. ENV_. L.
REv. 1 (1995) (arguing that uses prohibited by the doctrine of custom or the public trust
doctrine should be noncompensable under Lucas); Jamee Jordan Patterson, California Land
Use Regulation Post Lucas: The History and Evolution of Nuisance and Public Property
Laws PortendLittle Impact in California, 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 185 (1993)
(arguing that where uses of property interfere with "public property rights acquired through
actual or implied dedication, public trust rights, or state waters including ground water and
navigable waters" and possibly the State's interest in fish, game, and wildlife, deprivation
of such uses should not constitute a taking). But see James S. Burling, Of Nuisances and
Public Trusts-Can Lucas Be Evaded?, C997 ALI-ABA 259, 274, 276 (1995) (arguing that
the "Public Trust Doctrine should logically have no ability to negate the existence of a
regulatory taking" because to do so would be to retroactively redefine existing interests
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the opinion explicitly made the existence of a taking dependent upon each
state's law of property and nuisance, potentially allowing a taking in one
Thus, the Court in
state that would not have been a taking in another.'
and the normathe
expectational
over
definitional
the
privileged
Lucas
172
to fully explain
two
the
latter
than
other
One must look to fronts
tive.
Justice Scalia's resort to common-law constitutionalization in Lucas.
B. Common Law as Institutional Empowerment
The resolution of the Lucas case was the product of two distinct
features of American constitutional law: (1) the lack of an articulated
constitutional definition of property and the resultant dependence upon
state-created expectations'7 3 and (2) the incorporation of the Takings
Clause by the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to state and municipal
governments. 74 As a means of. constraining federal power, the former
feature theoretically made a great deal of sense. Allowing the states to

define property rights that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal
government from taking without just compensation certainly created a more
potent institutional check on federal power than if the power of definition
lay in federal hands alone.

based upon newfound societal needs when at the time that the property right was created,
no such "modem notions of an expanded public trust" existed).
171. There is, however, a tension in the Court's opinion between normative and
definitional conceptions of property. The Court made clear (with reference to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts) its view that no common-law principle would have been able
to prevent the use at issue in Lucas. The Court wrote "[i]t seems unlikely that common-law
principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements
on petitioner's land; they rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land." Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1031. The Court went on to say the question was "one of state law to be dealt
with on remand." Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and JudicialConservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 319
(1993) (noting that Justice Scalia "writes in places as if there is just one American
background law of property and nuisance.., that is common to the national jurisdiction and
all the state jurisdictions").
172. "The Lucas Court seems to have forsaken familiar notions of reasonable
expectations as a measure of property rights in favor of what Justice Scalia calls a
'categorical' rule; in this instance a rule drawn from a historical definition that is quite
different from a rule of expectation." Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself":
The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 943, 944-45
(1993). There is an obvious overlap, as Sax notes, between definition and expectation in the
sense that people make their decisions according to the background law. Id. at 945.
Nonetheless, as Justice Kennedy noted, statutes can create expectations as well, but the Court
leaves those expectations out of the definition. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
173. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
174. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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The combination of the historic deference to state definitions of
property with the application of the Takings Clause to localities, however,
ensured that the power of definition would now be in the hands of the
same entity that incorporation of the Takings Clause was supposed to
constrain. The Court had to determine which institution would have the
power to check encroachments upon constitutionally protected property
rights. After Lucas, the Court determined that, in the area of total takings
at least, the various state judiciaries have primary authority.' 5
Yet the importance of institutional empowerment in the Court's
particular resort to common-law constitutionalization is easily overempha-

sized. To guard against this tendency, one must define more precisely the
nature of the power shift that Lucas engendered. One must first recognize
that post-Lucas state courts contribute now in two ways to the takings
determination-as constitutional decision makers and as common-law
decision makers.
State judges who preside over takings claims undoubtedly have more
power than they did with respect to the state legislature prior to Lucas."6
The Court effectively disregards the legislature's traditional role in defining
public nuisances by ruling that any legislative enactment that deprives

175. One commentator described the main issue in Lucas as one of "allocative
authority." Leading Cases, supra note 168, at 274; see also John A. Humbach, Evolving
Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 27 (1993)
(stating that the regulatory takings debate is "an institutional debate as to which branch of
government should have the final say on the substantive issues of land-use regulation").
Humbach and the comment, however, differ on which allocation the Court should have
preferred. The comment favored the courts, at least where a statute has deprived owners of
all economic use of their land, arguing that courts can more fairly balance competing
interests and provide a more predictable result through the evolution of precedent. See
Leading Cases, supra note 168, at 274-75. Pointing out, however, that "[ilt
is, after all, still
a comparatively rare event for legislatures to ban previously lawful uses of land[,]" Humbach
contends that the legislature is superior because it can address complex issues in a more
systematic way than the courts. Humbach, supra, at 16. Legislatures, subject to frequent
elections and constituent contact, are exposed to a greater diversity of views and are thus in
a better position to determine what the interests of the public require. Id. at 25-26. For a
unique twist on the debate, see FIsCHEL, supra note 159, at 355, for an argument that there
be judicial supervision of the actions of local governments but not state legislatures.
176. Ironically, this is happening at a time when state legislatures are seriously
considering and enacting regulatory takings legislation to aid property owners. See John A.
Humbach, Should Taxpayers PayPeople to Obey EnvironmentalLaws?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 423, 423 n.2 (1995) (citing NationalAudubon Society's "Takings" Fifty State Review,
A CLEAR VIEW (Clearinghouse on Envtl. Advocacy/Envtl. Working Group, Wash., D.C.),
Dec. 1994, at 3) (pointing out that as of the end of 1994, 83 takings bills had been
introduced in 33 states, six of which had been enacted into law). This fact is not an
argument against empowering the courts. An activist court is little danger to a legislature that
wants to overprotect property rights, whereas an activist legislature could easily shift back
to overregulation if the courts lacked the power to stop it.
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property of all value must be compensated unless it coheres with "background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance.. 177 As a
result, the governmental body defending a regulation faces a heightened
burden ofjustifying regulations which deprive property of all economically
viable use. Indeed, a desire to limit legislative power at least in this
narrow area of takings law seems to fuel most of the Lucas opinion.'7 8
The recourse to the common law per se is not what empowers the
judiciary. Rather, Lucas empowers state judiciaries presiding over takings
cases in the same way that any heightened scrutiny standard would
empower them. Thus, objections to Lucas on institutional empowerment
grounds are at their root concerned about the extent to which the Fifth and

177. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. As discussed above, legislative enactments almost
certainly do not qualify as background principles of property law under the Court's takings
jurisprudence. "[B]y the 1800's in both the United States and England, legislatures had the
power to define what is a public nuisance, and particular uses often have been selectively
targeted." Id. at 1052 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, "[flor hundreds of years,
state legislatures and their parliamentary predecessors exercised the power to declare new
kinds of public nuisance and add to the list of socially intolerable uses of land as new needs
became evident." John A. Humbach, "Taking" the ImperialJudiciarySeriously: Segmenting
PropertyInterests andJudicialRevision ofLegislative Judgments, 42 CAT. U. L. REV. 771,
772 (1993); see also Babcock, supra note 170, at 22 ("[B]oth the legislatures and the courts
have played major roles in expanding the reach of common law nuisance, particularly with
respect to protection of the environment and natural resources."); Michael C. Blumm,
Property Myths, Judicial Activism, and the Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL. L. 907, 908 (1993)
('[N]uisance law includes, there is no question, the background of statutes."). The Second
Restatement of Torts characterizes "whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance
or administrative regulation" as a "[c]ircumstancel that may sustain a holding that an
interference with a public right is unreasonable" and thus a public nuisance. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). Note also "the [19th century] defense of 'statutory
justification,' which exempted mills, railroads, and other enterprises operating under franchise
from the government from the reach of ordinary nuisance law." Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and
the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REv. 189, 197
(1990). It is also unclear what the Court would make of the Louisiana law of nuisance
which is entirely derived from its civil code. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 667-69 (West
1972 & Supp. 1997); see also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significancefor
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252 (1996) (arguing that contrary to a
widely accepted historical premise, colonial land use regulation went far beyond nuisance
law and had purposes other than harm prevention).
178. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 (noting that an approach to regulatory takings that
only required the legislature to point out some noxious use that it was attempting to prevent
"would essentially nullify... limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power").
For an example of the Supreme Court doing the opposite and disempowering state courts in
favor of state legislatures in the area of constitutional interpretation, see Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), which reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision that a state law banning the sale of milk products in plastic nonreturnable containers
but permitting sales in other nonreturnable containers such as paperboard cartons was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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Fourteenth Amendments require the Court to be suspicious when a
regulation deprives property of all of its value. To the extent that total
regulatory takings implicate the Constitution, Justice Scalia is hardly
unreasonable in ensuring the effectiveness of that protection by insulating
those rights from the whims of a legislative majority. The Bill of Rights
is not a top ten list with some rights deserving greater protection than
others. On the other hand, to the extent the Constitution cannot be fairly
read to protect against such total regulatory takings beyond the minimal
scrutiny applied to all economic regulations, commentators correctly point
out the contradiction with Justice Scalia's constant criticism of judicial
activism. 79

The result is no different from what it would have been if the Supreme
Court had determined that some other test should guide the determination
of the acceptability of a regulation that deprives property of all economic

value. State courts would have the same responsibility for fleshing out and
applying that test. Moreover, the use of state common law as a standard
does not increase the power of state courts actually presiding over takings
claims relative to the federal courts. Under doctrines of ripeness and res

179. See, e.g,, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that a woman's right to have an abortion, similar to bigamy,
should not be constitutionally protected because "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing
about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be
legally proscribed" and further, the democratic process should determine the wisdom of
restrictions on abortion). Justice Scalia notes that "[t]he Court's temptation is ... towards
systematically eliminating checks upon its own power .... I"d. at 981; see Humbach, supra
note 177, at 771-72 (arguing that the reasoning behind Justice Scalia's PlannedParenthood
dissent dictated upholding in the Takings area the "traditional authority of legislatures to set
public policy on problematic uses of land" and a rejection of "judicial preemption of laws
duly made under our nation's democratically-driven processes"); see also Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1060 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's opinion "seems to treat history
as a grab bag of principles, to be adopted where they support the Court's theory, and ignored
where they do not"). Blackmun points to a number of cases where the Court upheld
regulations invoking police power. Id. at 1047-48. Justice Scalia's response was essentially
that none of those cases deprived the regulated property of all of its value. Moreover,
according to Justice Scalia, a regulation that eliminates all a property's economic value is
prohibited by a "historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
our constitutional culture." Id. at 1028 (majority opinion). But Justice Blackmun points out
the fallacy of such a compact by observing that if one looks to early common law for
background principles, then regulations would not have been compensable at all given the
early understanding of the Takings Clause. See id. at 1060 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If
one looks to later understandings, however, then one has to confront the fact that
"legislatures regularly determined which uses were prohibited, independent of the common
law, and independent of whether the uses were lawful when the owner purchased." Id. at
1060; see also Michelman, supra note 171, at 323 (calling Justice Scalia's assertion of a
constitutional compact a "naked assertion... because the Lucas opinion refers to no source
external to its subscribers for its crucial claim of judicial knowledge").
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judicata, state courts almost always have the first and last word on state
takings issues, barring a successful appeal to the Supreme Court. 80
In contrast, the state judge, when presiding over a public or private
nuisance case, is empowered specifically by the Court's resort to the
common law. The state judge's decision is now invested with significance
that exceeds its impact upon the rights of the parties involved and the
impact of the case on state property law because the state court decision
determines the scope of a right protected under the federal Constitution.
Moreover, federal courts adjudicating takings claims also are presumably
bound by this state court precedent assuming they find, as required by the
Lucas Court, that it is "an objectively reasonable application of relevant
precedents.''
The significance of this empowerment, however, will
depend largely upon the ability of plaintiffs to successfully bring cuttingedge nuisance actions in state courts and to shape the law of nuisance in

a way that might eventually affect the resolution of a takings claim.'
The desire to empower state courts, at least in the narrow area of "total

180. One should not mistake the use of state common law as a grant of more power to
state courts in presiding over state or local inverse condemnation actions than such courts
had previously with respect to the federal courts. Leading Cases, supra note 168, at 274,
seems to make this error when it states that the majority's opinion allocated authority to the
"state judiciary rather than to the state legislature or the federal courts." (emphasis added)
The comment later says that the Lucas opinion "clearly leaves room for federal court review

of state court interpretation of common law nuisance doctrine." Id. at 276 n.61. In practice,
this will not be the case under the Court's prior precedent. The reason is that state courts,
as a practical matter, have near exclusive authority (allowing of course for Supreme Court
review) over such disputes as a result of the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Williamson
County Reg'! Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
The case required property owners complaining of a state or local taking to exhaust
both state administrative and judicial remedies. The result of the state court's decision is
generally dispositive in the dispute, for res judicata generally will bar any further attempt
to bring the suit in federal court. If her claim was denied in the state, the property owner's
only recourse as a general rule is an appeal to the Supreme Court. See generally Thomas
E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J.
LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 37, 56-68 (1995) (explaining the Williamson case in detail).
Thus, the only way that a state court presiding over a takings claim has more power
after Lucas than it did relative to federal courts prior to Lucas is that the Supreme Court will
doubtless be less eager to review the reasonableness of a state court's interpretation of its
own nuisance law than it would a federal standard, because a review of such a case will
have far less precedential value since each state has its own nuisance standard and because
of the federalism implications of telling a state that it has erroneously interpreted its own
law.
181. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18.
182. See Steven 1. Levine, Comment, Environmental Interest Groups and Land
Regulation: Avoiding the Clutches ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 48 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1179, 1213 (1994) ("[Environmental interest groups] may achieve success litigating
claims in court or lobbying for legislation that broadens a state's conception of nuisance.").
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takings," is clearly the motivating force behind the Lucas opinion.
Although this impulse does not fully explain the Lucas Court's resort to the
constitutionalization of state common law, this desire to empower state
courts explains the preference for judicially created expectations and
definitions over legislative ones. Supreme Court ripeness doctrine and the
presumption against regulations depriving property of all economic value
ensure that the state courts would have the last word on takings by state
regulations. The Court's preference for the common law itself over some
other standard of heightened scrutiny, however, still requires some explanation.
C. Common Law as Methodological Constraint
A concern for background expectations does not fully justify the

Court's approach inLucas, because it cannot explain the Court's preference
for expectations rooted in the common law over those rooted in statutes
and the past role of the legislature in regulating property rights. A concern
with oppression by legislative majorities largely animated the Court's
decision, but nonetheless does not fully explain its "choice of law."'

183. The Court could, in the alternative, have mandated that lower courts apply a

uniform heightened scrutiny standard, a uniform standard of nuisance, or even state takings
doctrine to determine if a regulation constituted a total taking. Professor Sax, for example,
wrote that he would have had much less trouble with the Lucas decision if it had "suggested
that heightened judicial scrutiny should be triggered when regulation deprives an owner of
all economic value." Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1455
(1993). Furthermore, nothing stopped the Court from adopting a heightened scrutiny test in
addition to the deference to state nuisance law. Doing so would have recognized the
difference between the police power and the expectations that compose a state's property
rights-a distinction recognized in Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22 (1922). See supra
note 157 and accompanying text. Another scholar has argued for a novel but extremely
compelling approach to takings law. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993).
Professor Rubenfeld suggested that the key to a coherent theory of the Takings Clause is the
word "use" rather than the word "taken." Id. at 1080-81. The Takings Clause, Rubenfeld
argues, prohibits the government's use of the productive capacities of another's property
without just compensation. Id. The adoption of this approach in Lucas would have obviated
the need for a total taking category, the constitutionalization of common law, or any sort of
alternative heightened scrutiny standard because the only issue would have been: Did the
government's regulation take over property for society's use? Indeed, Rubenfeld suggests
that the adoption of a nuisance test is somewhat perverse. See id. at 1095. "The 'balancing'
of public interest against private loss, which assumes that compensation is less warranted the
more the state profits from using some of its citizens' property, misses the entire point of
the compensation guarantee." Id. (emphasis in original). Rubenfeld also sees little
difference between nuisance analysis and the noxious use analysis the Court ostensibly
jettisoned in its Lucas opinion. Id. at 1093. Although Rubenfeld can explain virtually every
Supreme Court result with reference to the usings principle, his approach nevertheless is still
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Though the judiciary gained power relative to the legislature as a result of
Lucas, the reliance on the common law also constrains the judiciary in a
particular way.
One senses from the Lucas opinion that the Court was not fully content
with its own decision to constitutionalize fifty different bodies of common
law. For example, while the Court states that all of a state's background
property law figures into the total takings analysis, the Court focuses on
nuisance."' Although the opinion explicitly disaggregates takings law
by linking it directly to the nuisance law of each state, the Court hints
strongly at what it expects that law to look like.'85 Moreover, the Court
makes clear that new principles of common law will be treated just like
statutes, stating that "[a]ny limitation so severe [as to deprive property of
all of its value] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation)."' 86 The resort to the common law may be attributed partially to the
Court's deference to a state's traditional role of defining its own property
rights as well as a consequent reluctance to attempt an articulation of a
federal standard. 7 Professor Michelman, however, reads Lucas's
requirement that a state's validation of a legislative enactment which
deprives property of all economic value must be an "objectively reasonable" interpretation of past precedent as a potentially massive intrusion
upon the state's right to interpret its own law.'88 Michelman correctly
points out that the opinion, at least theoretically, gives the Supreme Court
the power to admonish a state court for incorrectly interpreting its own
precedent.'89 The Court might even constitutionalize a particular common-law method of interpretation, selecting, for example, a jurisprudence

of rules rather than one of flexible principles. 9 ' Consequently, Michelmana road on which the Court has not yet consciously traveled, although it seems to be one
worth exploring in the future.
184. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
185. Id. at 1030-31.
186. Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
187. But see Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). The
Webb's Court, in invalidating a Florida statute allowing the state to claim the interest earned
on an interpleader fund deposited with the court, made no reference to Florida law, instead
referring to the "usual and general rule" that interest follows the principal. Id. at 162. The
Webb's case suggests that there is some constitutional minimum of property rights below
which a state may not go even if the right was not previously recognized by state law. For
a more extended discussion of Webb's, see TRIBE, supra note 158, at 609-10. In imposing
the definitions of other jurisdictions upon Florida, the Webb's Court's actions bear more than
just a passing resemblance to those of the Honda Court.
188. Michelman, supra note 171, at 318, 324-28.
189. Id. at 314; cf.Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290-91 (1967) (holding that federal
law governs questions concerning ownership of land "deposited by the ocean on adjoining
upland property conveyed by the United States prior to [Vashington] statehood").
190. Michelman, supra note 171, at 325-26. Richard Lazarus has noted a gradual
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notes a potentially stark contrast between the Court's conservative desire
property rights and its conservative leanings favoring federalto protect
1 91
ism.
However, another model simultaneously quells federalism concerns and
provides a functional explanation for the Court's reliance upon the common
law. This model focuses on a court that has wearied somewhat of the
takings morass and is seeking, at least for the narrow category of so-called
total takings, a way to operationalize constitutional law without requiring
the constant monitoring by the Supreme Court. The Court's frustration with
the regulatory takings issue has led it to establish categorical standards for
takings analysis such as the total deprivation of value in Lucas."9 If the
Court envisioned itself in the role of monitor, it would not have created
fifty different state standards for total takings because the different
standards certainly do not support Supreme Court opinions with broad
precedential value. Sax notes that "[p]resumably, states will have
substantial latitude in determining the extent to which their existing legal
principles limit property rights. 193

elimination in nuisance law of an interpretative approach emphasizing rigid, formalistic,
property-based rules "in favor of balancing the competing considerations, including both
individual equities and broad societal interests, of each party's legal position." Richard J.
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 663 (1986). Some fear the
Court's resort to a more definitional approach to property law will require a return to a less
flexible approach to nuisance law. Yet given the Court's emphasis on the essentially
indeterminate factors of the Restatement, one might question whether the Court really
expects state courts to apply nuisance law in a rule-like fashion. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1031. Indeed, it is ironic that Justice Scalia described nuisance more in terms of the modernstandards approach than the older rules-based approach, given that his emphasis on rights
that inhere in the title would seem to favor the older approach.
191. See Michelman, supra note 171, at 318. Fisher also criticized the framework
which authorizes the Court to overrule state interpretations of state law. Fisher, supra note
149, at 1407. Fisher notes that
[a] state judge whose interpretation is overturned by the Supreme Court
thus could not help but see in such a ruling an adverse evaluation of
either his competence or his honesty. In sum, if it is taken seriously,
the nuisance exception to the Lucas test may lead to considerable
awkwardness and resentment.
Id.
192. Sax, supra note 183, at 1437.
193. Id. at 1438. Moreover, the Court sent the federal courts packing a long time ago
in the area of state takings through the combination of ripeness doctrine and res judicata
generally barring federal court takings review. See Richard J.Lazarus, Putting the Correct
"Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. RPv. 1411, 1430-31 (1993). Lazarus notes:
State court judges are not likely to conclude that their own application
of precedent is not 'objectively reasonable.' And, while federal judges
might be more willing to second-guess their state judicial counterparts,
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Potentially, the Court could have adopted a third model. It could have
wholly eliminated the relevance of past understandings by creating a new
standard for those situations where a regulation deprives a parcel of
property of all of its value. 9 4 This model is the flip side of constitutionalizing the common law and would have resembled the Court's action in
New York Times v. Sullivan.9 5
The Lucas and Sullivan Courts approached the federalism question in
markedly different ways. Both reached out to protect a right they viewed
as constitutionally protected by refusing to defer to the organ of state
government that they saw as threatening those rights. Yet Lucas tells states
that the Court will monitor their application of their own law, and Sullivan
tells the states that they will have to abandon certain aspects of their own
substantive law.
Assuming that the Court had to find a check on the power of state
legislatures to redefine property rights through regulation, then which is the
greater intrusion upon state power: establishing a federal constitutional
standard that trumps the traditional common law or deferring to state
substantive law and instructing lower (mainly state) courts to monitor for
its misapplication? "9The latter is potentially more insulting, but Justice
Scalia may have recognized that approach is also less disruptive and
certainiy not unprecedented as a matter of judicial federalism."' More-

they are not likely to have much opportunity to do so. The Supreme

Court's ripeness rules effectively require that 'as-applied' takings
challenges be initiated in state administrative and judicial fora.
Id. at 1430.
194. On the other hand, the Court could have attempted to adopt a broader expectations-based view of property that incorporates background understandings that are not necessarily
rooted in the common law. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(describing such an expectation-based view). Once again, by rejecting this view, the Court's
opinion demonstrates that it is concerned with more than just expectations.
195. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
196. Professor David Shapiro pointed out that just because something is a lesser
intrusion does not necessarily mean that it is more acceptable as a matter of federalism if
there is no power justifi~ng the federal action. Discussion with David Shapiro, Professor of

law at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts (April, 1996). In this case, however,
either option would have been within Justice Scalia's power-assuming that regulations
depriving property of all value merit some kind of special scrutiny.
197. Fisher's criticism ignores the precedent allowing for federal review of state court
determinations of state law in non-diversity contexts. See Fisher, supra note 149. Ever since
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), the federal courts have reviewed
state questions of law that are antecedent to the determination of a federal right. "[W]here
a state law ruling serves as an antecedent for determining whether a federal right has been
violated, some review of the basis for the state court's determination of the state-law
question is essential if the federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination
... ." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 521; see also Demorest v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944) (stating .'[e]ven though the constitutional protection
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over, the second approach has the added federalism advantage of forcing
federal courts adjudicating takings claims to defer to a state-created body
of law.19 Finally, the Court may have recognized that the occasion will
be rare for the kind of insult Professor Michelman fears because the Court
will not likely review state court interpretations of state nuisance law.
Not only is constitutionalizing the common law less disruptive to state
property law, but it also operationalizes takings law in a way that is both
substantively appealing to the Court and methodologically familiar to the
states. As mentioned above, the Lucas opinion is written as though the
Court has something in mind but does not quite want to say it. The Court
does not articulate any unified theory of what state property law must look
invoked be denied on non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire whether
the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis. If unsubstantial,
constitutional obligations may not be thus evaded' (quoting Broad River Power Co. v. South
Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930))); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303
U.S. 95, 108-09 (1938) (overruling a state court's interpretation of state contract law in
assessing whether legislative action had resulted in an unconstitutional impairment of
contract); Michelman, supra note 171, at 324 (noting that "Lucas might just be a case of
federal judicial oversight in the historically approved mode of ensuring against circumvention of federally guaranteed rights by opportunistic manipulation of state law by state
judges"). Moreover, the fear of Supreme Court arrogation of state court interpretative
authority is almost certainly unwarranted because it is unlikely that the Court will be anxious
to review cases that turn solely on state court interpretations of their own law. Fisher,
therefore, almost certainly exaggerates when he writes that "[w]e can thus expect to see the
Supreme Court reexamining and sometimes overturning state courts' interpretations of their
own states' common law." Fisher, supra note 149, at 1407. Nonetheless, the potential for
judicial abrogation exists, and Professor Michelman argues that "charges of circumvention"
of a state court's own precedent should be "firmly documentable" to avoid a massive insult
to state courts. Michelman, supra note 171, at 324. The Court in Demorest, for example,
addressed the question of whether the state had previously created a certain defined type of
property interest. Demorest, 321 U.S. at 47-48. The law of nuisance is so indeterminate,
however, that it would be difficult to review such decisions without imposing a fairly
structured style of interpretation upon the state courts. Michelman, supra note 171, at 32425. The difficulty might just as easily suggest that the Court will not bother, and that if
members of the Court should attempt it, they would lose other members of the Lucas
majority.
198. The extent of the federalism insult also depends upon which state court decisions
regarding background property law are scrutinized. For example, could the Supreme Court
under Lucas rule that a prior state decision on nuisance law was a misinterpretation of past
precedent when that decision did not involve a takings claim but was relied upon by the state
defendant in a later takings action? Or could it only rule upon interpretations of state law
made by state courts in takings claims? The latter would be much more in keeping with past
Supreme Court precedent allowing review of antecedent state questions so as not to allow
questionable interpretations of state law to defeat federal rights. The former would be much
more unprecedented and a far greater intrusion upon state sovereignty. The Court's opinion
suggests that it will review the interpretation of past precedents by the court adjudicating
the takings claim; however, there is no indication that the Court will review the validity of
the state court precedents upon which the state relied.
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like, but the Court certainly states its perception as to what state property
law will look like. Most significantly, the Couri citing specific portions
of the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, states:
The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly
situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law
prohibition (though changed circumstances or new knowledge may
make what was previously permissible no longer so [sic], see id.,
§ 827, Comment g. So also does the fact that other landowners,

similarly situated,
are permitted to continue the use denied to the
9

claimant.

Other factors relevant in the "total taking" inquiry include
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent
private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities,...
the social value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to
the locality in question, .. . and the relative ease with which the
alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners)
alike ..... o
Thus, the Court seems to expect that nuisance law shares the Takings
Clause's concern with limiting the "singling out".of property owners to
bear burdens that others similarly situated do not currently have to bear nor
have had to bear in the past.20' Moreover, taking into account longstand-

199. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
200. Id. at 1030-31. Not all of the factors that Justice Scalia references are uniform
from state to state. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 177, at 234-35 (pointing out that courts in
the vaijous states accord varying significance to the utility of the defendant's conduct in the
nuisance balancing test). Moreover, one question that is unaddressed in Lucas is the
relevance of the particular redress that a state court provides for nuisance-like conduct.
After all, a state regulation is the functional equivalent of an injunction. If a state's nuisance
law generally allows only damages for nuisances, is a state thereby prevented from
forbidding the use? See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.
1970) (granting "an injunction which shall be vacated upon payment by defendant of such
amounts of permanent damage to the respective plaintiffs as shall... be determined by the
court").
201. The extent of singling out in Lucas was palpable. Justice Kennedy noted in
concurrence that, "[h]ere, the State did not act until after the property had been zoned for
individual lot development and most other parcels had been improved, throwing the whole
burden of the regulation on the remaining lots." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035-36. For evidence
of the Court's concern with "singling out," see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960), which held that the purpose of the Takings clause is "to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
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ing use brings reasonable expectations back into takings analysis through
a common-law back door. 2 Nuisance law asks many of the questions
that the Court thinks should be asked, which largely explains the Court's

preference for that body of law.
While at least one commentator termed nuisance the "analytical
equivalent" of the noxious-use test rejected by the Court, the Court clearly
expects that justifying legislative action under the nuisance test will be
more difficult than under a requirement that the legislature simply articulate
some harm its actions mitigate-at least where regulations require property
to remain essentially in its natural state. 3 However, while the Court's
inattention to the legislature's historic role in regulating property may
indicate a certain agenda, the Court's use of the common law is not solely
a proxy for its own policy concerns. 2" Indeed, just as significant is the
combination of constraint and evolutionary development engendered by the
resort to a common-law method that involves many of the policy concerns
underlying the Takings Clause." 5 With the common law comes a ready
made body of precedent, principles, and understandings which judges
utilize in justifying their decisions.2"s Moreover, the common law has
be borne by the public as a whole."
The Court's concern with "singling out" also motivates the first part of its test. While
the Court mentions other concerns in addition to singling out, it also notes that
at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to
indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply "adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life" in a manner that secures an
"average reciprocity of advantage" to everyone concerned.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (citation omitted); see also FisCHEL, supra note 159, at 351-55
(advocating a "normal behavior" standard that would not require compensation when
government acts to prevent deviation from some community norm). While Fischel notes that
the normal behavior standard allows for more regulatory deprivations to go uncompensated
than nuisance law; nonetheless, the sentiment expressed by Justice Scalia above seems to
resemble Fischel's proposed standard. Id. Professor Fischel differs from Justice Scalia,
however, in that he would allow deference to state legislatures in their declarations of what
is normal behavior. Id. at 355.
202. Moreover, asking whether the government or claimant could have mitigated the
harm through less disruptive means seems to resemble a narrow tailoring standard.
203. Lazarus, supra note 193, at 1426.
204. Indeed, all of the restrictions in the "background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance," not simply those of nuisance alone, can justify the failure to
compensate a property owner for a regulation that deprives a piece of property of all of its
value. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
205. As one commentator noted, "Because courts are bound by precedent, which is
subject to the gradual evolution of the common law, a judicial definition of 'nuisance' is
more likely to remain predictable while retaining sufficient flexibility both to meet new
conceptions of 'social value' and to adapt to new measures for alleviating harms." Leading
Cases, supra note 168, at 275.
206. Note that in the Confrontation Clause arena, the Supreme Court resorted to the
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developed separate from the need to justify constitutionally legislative
action (although, of course, all common-law courts will in the future decide
nuisance cases with the knowledge that their decisions theoretically could
have constitutional significance). In addition to this disciplining measure,
constitutionalization provides a way of thinking about the problem of the
nature of property that is familiar to state judges and to the lawyers who
must advise their clients. The adoption of the common-law method
increases predictability for landowners and, thus, at least helps to further
the goals of reasonable expectations analysis even if it is not based upon
reasonable expectations theory.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, suggests that one should resort to
a state's entire legal tradition, in an effort to determine reasonable expectations, rather than simply the common law. While this approach is a more
realistic approximation of the history of state regulation of property than

the Court's, it is also a much more unfamiliar and thus uncertain standard.

Additionally, the system that the Court created is essentially self-operating
and virtually ensures that the Court will play a minor role in this narrow
area of takings law in the future.
Moreover, with constraint comes the opportunity for slow, guided
evolution. 7 The constitutionalization of the common law in Lucas
allows state courts to develop slowly the law of property under principles

common law so that courts could avoid having to consistently justify their decisions. The
opposite is true in Lucas.
207. Just how much evolution is a matter of debate. Some commentators are optimistic
about the adaptive potential of the common law under the Lucas total takings regime. See
Babcock, supra note 170, at 20-21 ("The nuisance doctrine's malleability results from the
multifactored balancing process judges employ to determine which harms to prohibit and
which to permiL The balance of utilities shifts over time to reflect changing mores and
expectations about personal conduct, thereby forcing the doctrine to change and evolve.')
(footnotes omitted); Funk, supra note 165, at 898-99 (arguing that background principles of
property are sufficiently flexible to adapt to new discoveries such as the value of wetlands);
Lazarus, supra note 193, at 1426 (noting the Court's explicit recognition in Lucas that the
application of nuisance and property law "requires a balancing of harms and social values
and may evolve over time with 'new knowledge' or 'changed circumstances.'... [This] is
a hopeful harbinger of what the Court might do in a case with facts more sympathetic to the
government"). But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
holding today effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legislature much of
its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property."); Humbach,
supra note 176, at 13-15 (pointing to language in the Court's opinion indicating that the
Court was more interested in seeing a petrified nuisance law than an evolving one); Sax,
supra note 172, at 945 ("The tone and rhetoric of Lucas seems deliberately calculated to cut
off arguments that changing times create changing needs, and with them changing
(diminished) expectations that property owners must internalize."); Sax, supra note 183, at
1455 (suggesting the Lucas majority, by accepting outdated conceptions of property, failed
to allow flexibility in dealing with government regulations).
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that are unique to each state's situation. At the very least the Court's
opinion makes clear that common-law principles will be able to accommodate changing "experiential propositions" which would include, for
example, new scientific understandings about the danger of a certain
practice." 8 Less clear is what effect Lucas will have on regulation which
combines new understandings about the interconnectedness of property
with new normative conceptions of the role of property in our society. Sax
believes that the Lucas majority has in mind the preservation of a
conception of property as something waiting to be transformed into another
economically beneficial use, a vision which frowns upon regulations which
require property to be preserved in its natural state.2"
Commentators have correctly pointed to Justice Scalia's preference for
rules-based jurisprudence as an important motivation for the Court's
decision in Lucas.21
Justice Scalia's desire for categorization quite

evidently led to the "total deprivation" rule, but it also contributed to the

"nuisance rule" as well. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia could not have had
illusions that he was creating certainty as he constitutionalized the
"impenetrable jungle." Thus, one student commentator set up a "straw
Scalia" when he wrote that "Justice Scalia's categorical nuisance exception
sets forth a deceptively simple test for noncompensable land use regulation:
The restriction must fit into the common-law definition of nuisance, or
208. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 ("[C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make
what was previously permissible no longer so."); see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE
NA'ruR OF THE COMMON LAW 37-42 (1988).
209. Sax, supra note 183, at 1442-46. Sax contrasts this "transformative" vision with
a notion of "the economy of nature" which views property as inherently interconnected and
as serving ecological functions for which the owner or custodian of the property may be
prevented from disturbing. Id. at 1442. The Court's model is too inflexible to accommodate
the "economy of nature" model, according to Sax. Id. at 1446. Simple heightened scrutiny
would have more effectively and flexibly balanced the competing interests of landowner with
ecology. Id. at 1455. But see Babcock, supra note 170, at 25-26 (arguing that the societal
interests implicated by wetlands destruction can be accommodated under a nuisance
framework and that a nuisance framework "provides a growing, not shrinking, opportunity
for regulatory authorities to protect the nation's coastlines and wetland resources").
210. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1177-82 (1989) (according to Scalia, rules foster predictability, both constrain and
"embolden" the decision maker, better provide for the appearance of evenhanded treatment,
and move judges closer to the role of "determiner of law" and farther away from the realm
of "finder of fact"). To Justice Scalia, the last factor is a problem because it essentially
acknowledges earlier than necessary that a point exists where the application of law stops.
Id. at 1182; see also Michelman, supra note 171, at 324-26 (arguing that Justice Scalia's
preference for rules helps explain the Lucas decision); Scott R. Ferguson, Note, The
Evolution of the "Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause: From Myth to
Reality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1539, 1560 (1994) (Justice Scalia's "desire to categorize takings
jurisprudence explains the apparent 180-degree shift in the status of the nuisance exception
manifested in Lucas.").
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another restriction inherent in the title." '' Justice Scalia never could have
intended to declare that nuisance was a simple test because he asserted in
his own opinion that nuisance was a balancing test. Once the Court
required the application of some form of heightened scrutiny, the standard
was inevitably going to be somewhat vague and require some discretion on
the part of the judge applying it. The nuisance balancing test is no less
clear than requiring that a regulation be narrowly tailored to fulfill an
important governmental interest. The difference is that the Supreme
Court's test defers more to state law and state approximations of state
interests and more resembles the policies that the Court has said drive the
Takings Clause. Thus, when Professor Michelman wrote that "[p]erhaps
it is by insisting that state judiciaries read their bodies of property law as
'laws of rules,' as composed of narrow rules only and not spacious
principles, that Justice Scalia means to protect the regulatory-taking project
'
from frustration by unsympathetic state judiciaries,"212
he too ignores
Justice Scalia's use of the Restatement balancing test to illustrate the
principles of nuisance.
Instead, one should view the Court's opinion as having required the
application of a categorical method with an underlying theory that
resembles the Court's past pronouncements on the policies that underlie the
Takings Clause. The case of Prah v. Maretti1 3 illustrates the distinction
between a methodology that allows for evolution and a categorical rule.
In Prah the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held private nuisance law (and
thus the Restatement balancing test) applicable to the blockage of sunlight
in contravention of precedent where judges were extremely reluctant to
grant easements for sunlight.214 The court found that the earlier unwillingness to provide such protection was prompted by three concerns: (1) the
rule that landowners could do whatever they wanted with their property as
long as it did not physically harm another's land, (2) the fact that sunlight
was only valuable for aesthetic reasons or illumination at the time, and (3)
society's interest in promoting land development.2 1 5 But the Wisconsin
court said times had changed in the sense that property was now more
heavily regulated for the general welfare. Sunlight had become useful as
a power source, and unhindered development was no longer considered
fully consonant with the "realities of our society."2 6 Thus, the court
continued to apply a certain method, but because of new understandings
drawn from society's evolving concerns, the court reached a result different
211. Ferguson, supra note 210, at 1561.
212. Michelman, supra note 171, at 325.
213. 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982).
214. Id. at 191.
215. Id. at 189.
216. Id. at 190.
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from the one it would have reached in the early twentieth century.
Admittedly, how Justice Scalia would feel about this example is
unclear. The Lucas opinion, however, gives no indication that courts are
bound by anything more than their own historical method for adjudicating
nuisance disputes. Indeed, Justice Scalia relies upon the Restatement
balancing test, which indicates a willingness to accept the evolution of state
property law. Nonetheless, the categorical method will generally bar
regulations that force property owners to keep property in its natural state.
If so, this will not be due to the rigidity of a rule but rather to the results
of a categorical balancing test.217 In essence, the Court attempts to
mandate a familiar way of approaching the problem and not a specific
result.
V. CONCLUSION
Constitutional interpretation is about coping with uncertainty and the
power that derives from it. The Supreme Court did not need the common
law to interpret the Confrontation Clause. The Court could have limited
the confrontation right to cross examining witnesses who testify in court
and to preventing the use of ex parte affidavits. Instead, the Court chose
to identify a norm that the Clause protects: the reliability provided by the
adversarial testing of evidence. If taken to the extreme, every hearsay
statement that a prosecutor sought to admit would have become a constitutional issue. The use of the common law prevented this situation from
coming to pass.
The Supreme Court uses the common law to solve interpretative
problems, and it does so in a manner that generally creates greater certainty
and stability in the law and adds at least the shine of legitimacy to its
work. The Court's use of the common law in the Confrontation Clause
context surely demonstrates that constitutional interpretation is not always
an entirely principle-driven enterprise. Yet while constitutional interpretation may be political, it is seldom about raw power grabs in our society and
more often about compromise and self-restraint.
Those with a political scorecard might note that in the three central
cases addressed by this paper, ideological conservatives arguably won each
time. Big business won a mechanism, albeit a limited one, for limiting
punitive damages awards. The use of the common law protected traditional
hearsay exceptions at the expense of defendants (although defendants
would have lost more had Justice Thomas's approach gained the Court's
favor). Finally, property owners won a limitation on state regulatory power.

217. Background principles such as the public trust doctrine are more definitional and
thus rules-based in nature.
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In the first two cases, however, the decision to constitutionalize the
common law met with approval from the various wings of the Court. In
the Confrontation Clause area, the resort to the common law made the
move to a more expansive interpretation of the Confrontation Clause more
politically acceptable. Moreover, in the Cruzan case the Court, while not
explicitly ruling on the issue, used the common law as support for at least
a liberty interest in refusing lifesaving medical treatment. In In re Winship,
the Court used the common law to expand the rights of the accused. These
examples suggest that the common law is not simply an ideological tool,
although the Court's sympathies certainly must enter into it.2 8
In Lucas Justice Scalia abandoned the attention to text, history, and
original intent that he advocates in other contexts. Even in that case,
however, the turn to the common law was a way to solve problems
spawned by nearly a century of a confusing body of law in the area of
regulatory takings. The Court's belief that the Takings Clause protected
against regulatory takings and the determination that the legislature could
not be trusted when enacting certain regulations created the need, in the
Court's mind, for a heightened scrutiny standard. The decision that the
common law would serve as that standard can be explained as much by
deference to state property law and its familiarity and stability as by a
simple desire to protect property rights." 9 Nonetheless, the establishment
of state common law as the exclusive way of justifying a total taking was
seemingly out of keeping with such precedents as Jackman v. Rosenbaum
and general historical understandings about the police power.
One would expect that states' rights would generally be advanced when
the Supreme Court constitutionalizes state common law. Certainly, state
law won a significant victory in Ohio v. Roberts. Lucas and Honda,

however, are more of a mixed bag. In Lucas, the Supreme Court limited
state legislatures but continued to defer to state common law. Yet at the
same time, the decision raised the prospect of a future declaration by the
Court that a state had adopted the wrong mode of interpreting its own
common law. In Honda, the Court used tradition to limit the diversity of
state procedures. But states on balance win by a turn to tradition. For
example, had the Medina Court moved away from tradition and adopted a
multifactored balancing test in lieu of tradition to evaluate state criminal
procedures, the number of challenges to state procedures would surely have

218. For example, some basic intuitive sense of fairness probably motivated the Court
to give big business in Oregon the consensus protections that it supposedly lacked.
Moreover, in at least the Bouraily case, a desire for a certain result seemed clearly to trump
any consistent interpretative theory.
219. As noted above, however, the common law also acts as a certain kind of constraint
on the state judiciary. Justice Scalia does not sufficiently explain why the common law is
the only proxy for a heightened scrutiny standard that the Court allows.
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increased.
No interpretative method can make interpretation judgment-free. Yet
acceptance of this fact is of course not synonymous with judicial imperialism. The constitutionalization of common law paradoxically helped make
judging less dependent upon the personal views and guesses of judges.
While determining whether a practice is historically rooted or not can
involve a great deal of manipulation, the resort to tradition seems to require
less judgment from judges than, for example, a multifactored balancing
test. While the resort to common-law constitutionalization may have
achieved the goals of several justices by reducing the potential scope of the
constitutional rights of defendants, it also precluded the confusion and
disruption that would have been caused by turning every hearsay question
into a constitutional one: Finally, while the application of nuisance law
surely requires judgment by the presiding judge, a heightened scrutiny
standard would certainly not have resulted in value-free application and
would have lacked the constraint, legitimacy, and substantive appeal that
the use of nuisance law provides.
The constitutionalization of the common law is at its roots a conservative phenomenon. What began centuries ago as judges slowly developing
rules to address problems left unresolved by legislatures, became a tool for
the Supreme Court to use in filling gaps left by the Framers in a way that
preserves continuity and stability. It is as if the judges of the past, whose
words have been approved by the silence of the people, are speaking to
today's judges. What began centuries ago as an exercise of discretion on
the part of judges became a means of constraining discretion in constitutional interpretation.
But at what cost certitude? Plainly the Supreme Court's method in
Honda has drawn little controversy even if its interpretation of history and
Oregon's own procedures was erroneous. But the lack of controversy belies
serious problems with the Court's failure to articulate a proper theory of
why the constitutionalization of that particular common-law tradition was
appropriate. The case of the Supreme Court's largest abdication was also
the case that avoided overruling the common-law hearsay exceptions that
state courts have used for decades to convict criminals. The Court's
willingness to compromise probably reflected its lack of confidence in its
overall interpretation of the values the Confrontation Clause protected and
its inability to articulate a standard that would result in the consistent

application of the values the Clause protects. Moreover, the Confrontation
cases provide the only example where the Court resolved a constitutional
controversy without fully focusing on the objective content of the constitutional norm. It is only with the Lucas case that one has a sense that the
common law belonged both doctrinally and functionally in the Court's
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effort to operationalize a vague and unconstrained area of the law." °
The comedian Steven Wright once said, "You can't have everything.
Where would you put it?"' The constitutionalization of common law
reflects the perceptiveness of this axiom. The cost of certitude in the
Confrontation Clause area, and of avoiding a drastic result of which the
Court was unsure, was the partial abdication of the Court's interpretative
responsibility. Further, deferring to state common law expanded the
possibility of Supreme Court review of state court interpretations of state

law. The protection of an individual right resulted in the imposition of the
views of a majority of states upon a minority for no reason other than that
it was the majority. Deference to state-created definitions of property frees
the Court from the need to articulate its own standard for assessing the
validity of state regulation.
The politically acceptable results that may accompany common-law
constitutionalization thus can also bring along with them a certain
interpretative unsightliness. This combination partially reflects the fact that
constitutional interpretation cannot always be pretty. But it also reflects the
fact that the Supreme Court generally turns to the common law out of
weakness and not strength. The common law should not be used as a
means of escaping the articulation of constitutional values. Rather, it
should be used as a means to that end. For ironically, even as commonlaw constitutionalization is an effort to avoid the injection ofjudicial values
into constitutional interpretation, at least two of the cases discussed in this
paper have the feel of political compromise.
In the end, the constitutionalization of common law is more than
anything about the Court's attempt to read itself out of the interpretative
debate. The results of its work, however, show that the divorce of judges'
personalities from their work does not make the appearance of arbitrariness

220. This is not necessarily to approve of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence
to that point. It is merely to respect the Court's use of the common law once it had
determined that at least part of the regulatory takings doctrine needed to be operationalized.
One commentator proposes a similar approach for dealing with interpretative uncertainty in
a substantively appealing way that constrains judicial discretion and ensures "methodological evenhandedness." See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on

the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 971 (1989) (arguing that the Court
should use the common law to identify burdens on the free exercise of religion).
221. Or as Justice Scalia once wrote,
the value of perfection in judicial decisions should not be overrated. To
achieve what is, from the standpoint of the substantive policies
involved, the "perfect" answer is nice-but it is just one of a number of
competing values. And one of the most substantial of those competing
values, which often contradicts the search for perfection, is the
appearance of equal treatment.
Scalia, supra note 210, at 1178.
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go away. A way to avoid this unsightliness might be the articulation of a
theory that explains this example of the interconnectedness of American
law.
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